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-John W. Lee is Professor of Law at Marshall-
Wythe School of Law, College of Will iam & Mary. 
Over the past two decades, Lee has published over 
half a dozen articles on "active business" in section 
355. 
This article analyzes the 35-year evolution of the 
section 355 regulations from the perspectives of the 
jurisprudential dichotomy between general prin-
ciples and detailed rules and administrative law 
theory as to agency discretion. 
Professor Lee wishes to express his gratitude to 
the College of William & Mary for a research grant 
that assisted in the preparation of this article, to Lee 
Sheppard for her editorial assistance, and in particu-
lar to Alan Gunn for advice and encouragement 
from start to finish . 
I. INTRODUCTION 
A. Section 355 and a 25-Year Promise Fulfilled 
The legislative treatment of corporate divisions has 
varied . In itiall y, they were included with the organ ization 
provisions, and the predecessor to present section 355 
spawned Gregory v. Helvering. Although the government 
triumphed in the Gregory case, Congress though t Greg-
ory was insufficient to protect the Federal fisc . Corporate 
divisions offered too great an opportunity for bailing out 
corporate earnings, and the tax-free blessing was with-
drawn from them. This blanket consignment to tax purga-
tory, however, was argued to be too broad. By 1951 , 
Congress was receptive to the notion that the good and 
the bad could be effectively distinguished, and corporate 
divisions were revived, but tax deferral was denied to 
transactions used principally as devices for the distribu-
tion of earnings and profits to shareholders. In regulations 
issued in 1955, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) drew 
the line mandated by Congress primarily by restricting 
corporate divisions to distributions of an entire business. 
Under these regulations, a corporate division also cou ld 
effect a business division only by surrendering its tax-
free status. In practice, the IRS relied on this active busi-
ness requirement , but supplemented it with the argument 
that some distributions essentially were equivalent to a 
dividend and were, therefore, devices for a distribution of 
earni ngs and profits. The first prong of this two-part test 
did not fare well in the courts, and in 1964, after the 
courts had determined that a single business cou ld be 
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divided, the lAS announced that it would revise the 
regulations to permit the division of a Sing le business. 
The promise of revision was hailed by the tax bar, and 
advice that it be a complete overhaul of the exist ing 
regulations soon was abundant. Recognizing that any 
distribution necessarily produced a distribution of earn-
ings, many commentators argued that the presence of a 
good business purpose should be sufficient to pass the 
tax deferra l test . They also thought that less reliance 
should be placed on the definitional aspects of an active 
business . In short, they wanted less formalism and more 
inquiry into the question of whether a given distribution 
could be supported by reasons other than the desire to 
reduce the barriers between the shareholder and realiza-
tion of the corporate earnings. 
Many commentators . .. thought that less reli-
ance should be placed on the definitional as-
pects of an active business. 
Revision finally arrived a quarter of a century later, and 
the final regulations recently promulgated under section 
355 largely accomplish these goals. These regulations 
give substantial guidance to the practitioner about 
whether a transaction complies with them. More impor-
tant ly, they deal with the underlying policy and provide 
1029 
SPECIAL REPORTS 
their guidance at a level of sophistication that is un-
paralleled in Treasury regulations. 
B. Standards and Rules Under Jurisprudence and 
Administrative Law 
Professor Kennedy posits two opposed methods in 
American law for implementing substantive law: standards 
and rules . Tax lawyers wi ll recognize this as the famil iar 
substance and form debate in another guise.' A "stan-
dard" consists of a general principle or policy of a 
particular body of substantive law. In this context , the 
section 355(a)(1)(8) prohibition that the transaction not 
be used as a "device" to distribute earnings and profits , 
that is, a " bailout ," serves as a standard . It corresponds 
exactly to the underlying po licy. Under jurisprudential 
theory, a standard is functional ; it requires the decision 
maker to determine whether the facts of the particular 
transaction merit the desired treatment, 2 here tax deferral . 
A 'rule ' . .. is ideally capable of generating pre-
cise and predictable answers. 
A "ru le," by contrast, is definit ional. It is idea lly capab le 
of generating precise and predictable answers. ' The 
"active business" requirement of sections 355(a) (1)(e) 
and (b) is a rule , albeit vague. The underlying policy of 
the rule was prevention of a bailout , but the narrow 
definitions used in the 1955 regulat ions and amplify ing 
ruli ngs (particu lar ly the long-d iscredited two-bus iness 
requ irement) were both under- and overinclusive, as 
rules are wont. 4 For instance, pro rata divisions of two 
readily saleable active business entities easily could meet 
the Service's 1955 device and business purpose test. 
However, vertical and functional divis ions failed the test 
that there be two active pre-distribution businesses. Th is 
was a failure of policy, at least in the case of non pro rata 
separations. 
In general , Professor Kennedy believes that the advan-
tages of rules are (1) the restraint of arbitrariness by the 
decision maker, and (2) the attainment of certai nty or 
predictabi li ty .s A cost , however, is the inability to pre-
scribe rules which will accurately achieve the underlying 
policy objectives. Standards are more adaptable to po licy 
' Kennedy , " Form and Substance in Private Law Adjud ication ," 
89 Harv. L. Rev . 1685 (1976) . This article does not att empt to 
either explore or describe Professor Kenn edy's central inqui ry 
into the relati onship between the " two opposed rhetorical modes 
for dealing with substantive issues. . . . ind ividua lism and al-
tru ism," 89 Harv. L. Rev. at 1685, and ru tes and standards . " , 
"altrui st vi ews. , . Iead to willingness to resort to standards " . , 
wh i le individualism seems to harmon ize with an insistence on 
rig id rul es rig idly app lied." Id. Al so , this article does not explore 
Professor Kennedy 's method of tracing the conflict between 
altruism and individualism, viz., a "d ialectica l or structuralist or 
historicist or the method of contrad ictions . Id. at 1712, 1731-37, 
1774- 76. 
2/d . at 1688. 
' Id, at 1687-88. 
' Id, at 1689. 
Sid. at 1688-89. 
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goals ,6 Standards also differ from rules in that the former's 
greater generality is an attempt to deal with as many 
different potential fact patterns as pract icable. According 
to jurisp rudential th inking, generality increase the number 
of occasions of lawmaking by the administrative agency , 
rather than the legislature, 7 The irony, as Whitman's 
claSS ic artic lea reveals, is t hat the probable legis lative 
goal of the device rest ricti on (orig inal ly enacted in 1951 
as part of the 1939 Code predecessor of section 355) was 
to decrease judicial intervention and possib ly administra-
tive discretion as well . 
Conversely, jurisprudential scholarship observes that 
generally. detailed legislation decreases the discretion of 
the decision maker ,9 This theory may be accurate when 
applied to judges who follow the rules in deciding tax 
cases (but not so much as to courts that fashion new 
standards to overcome the ru les as witnessed, for in-
stance, by the cases forging ways around the no deduc-
tion of start-up costs rule'O) , However, detai led regulations 
promulgated by an administrati ve agency increase the 
prinCipled discretion of the agency as a decision maker, 
according to Professor Davis and subsequent admin istra-
tive law scholarship." "Structured discretion " serves pub-
l ic policy where rulemaking by the agency (here in the 
form of IRS private letter rulings) is routine ly, if not 
commonly , sought by the citizen ,12 Empirical knowledge 
about the proportion of corporate divisions in which 
private letter rul ings are sought, and the proportion 
Sid, at 1689, 
' Id. at 1689. 
·Whitm an , " Draining the Serbon ian Bog : A New Approach, to 
Corporate Separations Under the 1954 Code," 81 Harv, L. Rev . 
1194, 1202-03,1210 (1968) . 
"Kennedy, supra, note 1, at 1690. See Gregory v. Commis -
sioner , 27 B.TA 223, 225 (1932) , rev 'd , 69 F,2d 809 (2d Cir. 
1934), aff'd , 293 U.S. 465 (1935) (" A statute so meticulously 
drafted must be interp ret ed as a literal express ion of taxing 
po li cy , and leaves only the small in terstices for jud ic ial consid-
eration") . The Second Circuit formulated the o pposi ng fo rce to 
li teral ism of a broad , free-standing judicia l standa rd - business 
purpose, 
,oSee Lee, " Start-Up Costs , Section 195, and Clear Reflection 
of Income; A Tale of Talismans, Tacked-On Tax Reform, and a 
To uc h of Basics," 6 Va, Ta x Rev . 1, 5-6, 51-52, 56-58 (1986). Or 
the Second Circuit and Supreme Court in fashioning " bus iness 
purpose" as a counJerpoint to detai led tax ru les and abdi cat ion 
of judicial responsi bility . 
" Davis , " Di sc ret ionary Justice, A Pre lim inary Inquiry ," 103 
(LSU Press 1969); see also Mashaw, " Bureauc ratic Justice, 
Manag ing Social Disabi lity Claims," 103-22 (Yale Univ , Press 
1983) . 
" Whitman , supra , note 8, at 1249 (" the practice generally is to 
get advance rul ings" as to corporate separations) In a telephone 
conve rsation shortly after the 1989 revi sions, an at torney in one 
of the corporate divisions of the Office of Chief Counsel informed 
me that currently over 50 percen t o f the " inven tory" o f private 
let ter ru lings in the corporate reorganiza tion area involved pro-
posed co rporate d iv isions. Accord ing to the attorney , a substan-
t ial number o f these ru l ing requests inVOlve public compan ies, 
wh ich I suspect are position ing themselves after a two- to three-
year wait to unwind the results o f '60's d iversi fi cation with ou t 
t rigger ing inside taxation as to appreciation . Th e attorney also 
suspected that many of th e section 355 tran sactions under tak en 
to shrink companies in order to elect subchapter S dur ing the 
pre-1987 and 1987-88 transition periods d id not req uest advance 
private letter ru l ings. 
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audited, would be help ful here. A nother look at the use of 
"dispensing power" under section 355, that is, mandatory 
advance approval by the Service, is warranted , given the 
possibi l ity of "structured justice" under the new section 
355 regulations . 
Uncertainty encourages playing the audit lot-
tery and a/so creates traps for the unwary. 
Behavior modification goals also may influence the 
policy maker choice between standards and rules. Rules 
may encourage the risk-Iaker 10 walk the line, while 
standards may discourage risk-taking by creating gray 
areas .,3 ln a world where a very low percentage of income 
tax returns are audited, however, gray areas appare ntly 
encourage more aggressive or perhaps just more ignorant 
tax planning and return preparation behavior." Uncer-
tainty encourages playing the audit lottery and also 
creates traps for the unwary. Conversely, overly detai led 
rules may impose such high transaction costs that they 
eliminate the undesirable behavior; this has been the 
effect of the passive loss rules, '5 for example. Professors 
Doernberg's and McChesney's public choice analysis 
might suggest thai putting detailed rules in regulations 
crea tes a lucrative specialty for the drafter when he 
en ters private practice .,G While public choice theory holds 
for some rare cases, " section 355 and the new regulations 
do not fit the pattern .'6 
" Gifford , " Communication of Legal Standards, Policy De-
velopment , and Effective Conduct Regulat ion ," 56 Cornell l. 
Rev . 409, 426-30, 435-37 (1971) . 
" New York State Bar Ass 'n, Tax Section , "A Report on 
Complexity and the Income Tax ," 27 Tax l. Rev. 325, 330 (1972) . 
15Shavi ro, " Compliance and Enforcement under the Passive 
Loss Regu lations," 29 Tax Management Memorandum 155, 161 
(June 6,1988) . 
'6Doernberg , " The Market for Tax Reform: Public Pain for 
Private Gain ," 41 Tax Notes 965, 968 (Nov. 28, 1988) . See note 
17, infra . 
" Indeed, my first thought upon reading Doernberg & McChes-
ney , "O n the Accelerating Rate and Decreasing Durability of Tax 
Reform ," 71 Minn . L. Rev. 913 (1987), was that a "public choice" 
analysis could be applied more easily to staff drallers of tax 
sla tutes and regulations than to congressional tax committee 
members . As to the latter, clearly , the tax committee members 
take the PACs' money, but for my view as to the extent to which 
they deliver (in full) , other than as to "t ransitional " rules, see Lee, 
"Entity Classification and Integration : Publicly Traded Partner-
ships, Personal Service Corporations and the Tax Leg islative 
Process," 8 Va . Tax Rev. 57, 134-37 (1988) . As to "public choice" 
and staff, I suspect that in certain limited instances such public 
choice- ca rve-a-n iche analysis is valid (certain specia lists in 
subchapters K and S come to mind , see Moore, " A Proposal to 
Reduce the Complex ity of Tax Regulations," 37 Tax Notes 1167 
(September 14, 1987) (semble)) . In most instances , however , I 
suspect that th e sources of complexity on the part of legislative 
and Treasu ry staff are to be found elsewhere- for instance , a 
preference (possibly institutional) for detailed legislation (or 
com mittee reports at least) in order to cover most conceivable 
transactions , see S. Cohen , " Complexity of Regulations Reflects 
Aggressive Tax Planning, " 37 Tax Noles 1280 (December 21 . 
1987) ; great ability to so conceive ; and a little experience in a 
large tax department, wh ere maste ry of detailed tax statutes/ 
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The policy choice may not have to be between rules 
and slandards. Rules may be combined with standards, 
as in cases where "safe harbors" are allowed despite the 
use of a facts-and-circumstances test as the underlying 
standard. Some tax commentators advocated this format 
as providing certa inty for generalists who could read the 
Code , combined with "an area for those who want to 
venture into it where , if you really understand the cases, 
you can advise your client intelligently ."'9 
Conventional jurisprudential wi sdom, especially ac-
cording to Professor Kennedy , also holds that rules and 
standardS tend to shade into each other . For instance, a 
standard may be implemented by a number of per se 
regu lati ons is incu lcated . Th e res ulting statut e and imple-
menting regulations can be handled on ly by special ists. Such 
statutes and regulat ions may be appropriate wher e high bracket 
taxpayers have knowingly ente red the "th ic ket," see " Hearings 
on Tax Shelters, Accounting Abu ses, and Corporate and Securi-
ties Reforms" before the House Ways and Means Comm , 98th 
Cong ., 2d Sess. 32-33 (1984) (colloquy between Rep. Don Pease 
and Assistant Secretary for Tax Policy John (" BUCk ") Chapoton), 
reprinted in 6 "A Legisl ative History of th e Tax Reform Act of 
1984" (Bernard D. Reams. Jr . J .D., Ph .D., Ed . 1985) ("Tax 
Reform 1984" ). 
Mr. Chapolon. Unquestionably . . . they will tend to com-
plicate . .. . That is why every attempt has been made 
particularly in the tim e value of money changes to provide 
exception s so they do not apply to th e everyday taxpayer 
in normal transact ions and apply prinCipally to la rge ta x 
transactions, tax shelters, and otherwise, where very so-
ph isticated planning is involved. 
Mr. Pease. So in an effo rt to close off abusive tax 
shelters, we are going to furth er complicate a tax code 
many people feel is already too compl icated. 
Mr. Chapoton. I do not think we need to apologize when 
we complicate the tax code for very complicated transac-
tions, and that is the intent here. 
But I also believe that they are impractical wh ere small taxpayers 
and less sophisticated advisers frequently dwell. As my colleague 
Alan Gunn observes, the divorce rules Should not be overly 
detailed. See also Berman , "The Alim ony Deduction: Time to 
Slaughter the Sacred Cow," 5 Amer. J. of Tax Policy 49, 59 
(1986) . See a/so note 18, infra . 
,8Again such overly complex, detai led provis ions (whether 
statutory or regulatory , should not be used in the case 01 
everyday transact ions unless a two-tier tax regime (simple! 
complex) can be implemented. Alan Gunn points to the fiduciary 
income provis ions, subchapter J. Simi larl y, the ill - fated 1954 
House corporate provisions (subchapter C) and the equally ill -
fated 1960 House-passed revised su bchapter K dist inguished 
between little and big taxpayers subject to their regimes. The 
1980 Installment Sales Revision Act and accompanying regula-
tions also more subtly distinguished between simple and com-
plex provi sions. Even th e Subchapter S Revis ion Act in effect 
distinguishes sharp ly between "virgin" S corporations and S 
corporation converts (formerly C corporation or inheritor of C 
E&P) . My guess is none of the two-ti er systems really work well 
or would have worked well. But the tec hnique merits more 
thought . See generally Surrey , " Complexi ty and the Internal 
Revenue Code: The Problem of the Management of Tax Detail ," 
34 Law & Contemp. Probs . 673, 696 n . 28 (1969) . 
" Panel Discussions on Income Tax ReviSions before the 
House Ways and Means Comm " 86th Cong ., 1st Sess . 883 
(1959) (colloquy between Chairman Wilbur Mills and Hugh 
Calkin s, Esq.) (Hearings on "Tax Revi sio[1 Compendium" of 
Papers on Broadening the Tax Base), reprinted in 151953-1972 
Legislative Histories, Laws & Cong ressio nal Doc's (Bernard D. 
Reams, Jr., J .D., Ph .D., ed . 1985) ("1953-1972 Legislative His-
tories"). 
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rule s, either in the statute or accompanying regulations 
or case law adjud ication. Conversely, desiring to avoid 
injustice , decision makers may create so many exceptions 
that the rule becomes a standard in effect .20 Adm in ist rative 
law scho lars, on the other hand, be lieve that agencies 
us ing structured discretion - for examp le, by issuing reg-
ulations (ru le making) setting forth specif ic factors to be 
Ll sed in balancing tes ts implementing the desired stan-
dards and po l ic ies - can implement standards effectively 
wlli le maintain ing the bureauc rat's discretion judgment 
in application .21 They believe that detai led rules useful in 
channeling agency exe rci se of d iscretion can be de-
veloped by f i rst considering one problem at a tim e, then 
ann ou nc ing the hypothetical cases as rulings an d refrain-
ing from generalizing . General principles or standards 
can be d ivin ed from th is expe ri en ce . Later, the agency 
can formulate regulations to implement the standards in 
th e fo rm of structured di scretion n In the tax law, rules 
and standards often confl ict , both in the context of 
Jud ic ial revi ew of agency d iscretion and especia lly in 
doct rin al areas.2J 
The best policy usually is ' to legislate broad 
frameworks for administrative policymaking.' 
Tax theo ret icians, including Harva rd's Professors 
Brown and Surrey, have debated for some time the 
advantages of genera li zed tax statu tes , that is, standards , 
ve rsus deta iled , rule-oriented tax statu tes .24 Writing under 
Pro fessor Brown 's tutelage , Whitman called for a focus 
on the underlying policy (dev ic e) and would have dimin-
ished th e role of the additional mechanica l statutory 
detail of th e active business test. 2S Recently , the majority 
of students o f taxation follow the Surrey school calling 
for a general tax statute that is implemented and amplified 
through indisputably detai led Treasu ry regulat ions . They 
prefer th e greater fl exibility of administrative ly amending 
regulati o ns in li g h t o f deve lop ing admin istrat ive and 
" Kennedy. supra note 1. at 1700-01 . 
" See note 11 . supra. 
" Dav is. supra note 11 , at 60. 
" See note 1 O. supra. 
" Brown , "An Approach to Subchapter C," 3 Tax Revi sion 
Compendium 1619, 1619- 20 (1960) (detailed tax statutes lead to 
defI ciencies and anomalies appearing wh ich requ ires even more 
intricate elaborations of pattern; fundamental source is an attempt 
to eliminate the necessity for responsible administration) : Surrey, 
supra note 18, at 695-702, 703-07 (debate between generalized 
and part icu larized ta x statu tes: concludes ideal is genera lized 
statute with deta iled regu lations) . Interestingly, the Tax Reform 
Act of 1969. wh ich was Surrey's brainchild , see Lee, supra 8 Va . 
Tax Rev. at 132. n. 346, rarel y took th is tack (section 385 
constitutes a conspi cuous except ion) . The debate had begun as 
ea rl y as the 1920s. See notes 31 and 32. in fra. and accompanying 
text. 
" Whitman . supra note 8, at 1253-57 . 
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judicial exper ience under the stat ute.26 Professor Davis 
agrees that the best policy usually is " to legis late broad 
frameworks for administrative policy-making ."27 
Under the Surrey approach , the role of courts in 
reso lving the substance and form d ichotomy in tax law is 
lessened . Section 355 does not fit this model . The Fi rst 
Ci rcuit's land mark op inion in Rafferty ,28 i ncorporati ng 
Whitman 's vision, forms both the skeleton and mu c h of 
the f lesh of the " device" and " act ive bus iness" porti ons of 
th e long-awaited 1989 revisions . The genera l statute cum 
detailed regulations mode l closely paralle ls Professor 
Davis' thinking about " discretionary justice" in adminis-
trat ive law and in particular his concept of "structured 
discretion ."29 Section 355 and the case law and the 
variou s stages of the regulations interpreting it present 
an idea l laboratory for exploring these themes .3o 
II. SECTION 355: FROM THERE TO HERE 
A. The Statute 
The hi story of section 355 itself , as ably traced by 
Whitman, plays out in m icrocosm the debates between 
standards and rules and abou t who is the proper actor for 
the development o f the criteria- Congress , the courts , or 
the adm inistrators. The reo rgan ization provi sions through 
the Revenue Act of 1921 fo l lowed the phi losophy of 
genera l statutory principles w ith Treasu ry formulating 
specific rUles .31 However. th e first provisions explicit ly 
26E.g ., "Complex ity and the Income Tax, " supra note 14. at 
348-51 . But see Cohen, " Remarks," 26 Nat'l Tax J. 311. 311 -12 
(1974) . For an exce llent . br ief discussion of the recent pattern , 
in cluding the "worst of all worlds .. . ex tremely detailed stat-
utes ... with broad grants of regulatory au thority ... . ," see Evans, 
"The Condition of th e Tax Leg isla ti ve Process," 39 Tax Notes 
1581 , 1590 (June 27, 1988). 
USee Davis , sup ra note 11 , at 38. 
28 Rafferty v. Commissioner, 452 F.2d at 767 (1971) , cer t. 
denied, 408 U.S. 922 (1972) . 
29A ru le may provi de that at the right end the answer is 
always yes. and that at the left end the answer is always 
no; when it does that it conf ines di sc retion to the middle 
te rritory . But the rule may also st ructure the discret ion in 
that midd le ter ritory . For instance, it may provide that in 
exe rc ising discretion. th e agency will cons ider three fac-
tors. That much is a part ial st ru cturing of discre tion . The 
rule also may state the result when the th ree fac tors pull 
togeth er, but provide that the resu lt will be worked out 
from case to case when the three pull aga inst each ot her. 
Such a rule structures di sc retion , leaving many questi ons 
open . A ru le which does not genera lize bu t whi ch gives 
illustrations may help structure discretion. 
Davis, supra note 11 , at 103. 
3°1 confess tha t I am no impartia l observer, however, having 
sought to influence the directions of the revised regulat ions, and 
I am proud of my contributions. See Lee, " Functional Divisions 
and Other Corporate Separations Under Sec tion 355 After 
Rafferty ." 27 Tax L. Rev . 453 (1972) : Lee, " Proposed Regulations 
Under 355 Overhaul Device Test and Sing le-Business DiVisions." 
46 J. Tax. 194 (1977). The fina l regu lations showed me how 
much I missed . however, as did res tudy ing Wh itman's Serbon ian 
Bog in ligh t of the thought of Professo rs Ken nedy and Davis. I 
am grateful to my colleagues Alan Gunn and Charles Koch for 
steering me to them. 
3' Wh itman. supra note 9, at 1199. See Hearings on H.R. 8245 
before the Sen . Comm. on Finance. 67th Cong ., 1st Sess. 5 
(1 921 ) (statement of Dr. T.S. Adams, Tax Advisor, Treasu ry 
Dept ., dra ft ing goal of "a rather simple tax law th at the average 
man can understand") , reprinted in 9SA Interna l Revenue Acts of 
th e Un ited States 1909-1950 Legi slative Histories Laws and 
Admini stra tive Documents (Bernard D. Reams, Jr . revised 1979) 
("1 909-1950 Legislative Histories") . 
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permitting tax- free corporate divisions, enacted in the 
Revenue Act of 1924, show a reversed course under new 
tax advisers to Treasury. The advisers preferred minute 
articulation of the reorganization provisions with the 
avowed intention of providing predictabi l ity in al l con-
ceivable situations.32 
Nevertheless, Congress predictably33 failed to anticipate 
the avo idance techniques or "mere devices" such as 
those employed by Mrs . Gregory to avoid dividend treat-
ment on a distribution by her wholly owned corporation . 
Relying upon the corporate spin-off provisions introduced 
in 1924, she caused her wholly owned holding company 
to transfer shares in a publicly owned "target" subsidiary 
to a newly-formed wholly owned subsidiary which t he 
ho lding company spun off to her three days later . Three 
days later, she liquidated the new subsidiary, obtaining a 
stepped-up basis at a capital gain rate in the shares, 
wh ich she then sold to the buyer at no further gain . In 
1932, th e Board of Tax Appeals uphe ld Mrs . Gregory's 
scheme as a transaction clearly within the confines of the 
statutory languageY 
The Democratic Congress of 1933, generally unsym-
pathetic to business problems, was "acutely hostile to tax 
avoidance schemes."35 Res isting its first inclinat ion to 
repeal the reorganizatio n provisions in toto, 36 Congress 
in 1934 repealed only the spin-off provision and tightened 
up the definition of reorganizations in genera l.37 Split-ups 
still were permitted under that general reorganization 
definition. 36 The Second Circuit in Helvering v. Gregory39 
contemporaneously reversed the Board 's decision . The 
Supreme Court affirmed this reversal, finding no " busi-
ness or corporate purpose" in the transaction , which was 
a "mere device, " "a contrivance," and "an elaborate and 
devious form of conveyance masquerading as a corporate 
reorganization."40 Thus , the courts had fashioned the 
"business purpose" standard which came to be applied in 
all reorgan iza tions. 
According to Whitman , during the years 1947 to 1951, 
manifest congressional antipathy to judicial innovations 
" Whitman, supra note 9, at 1199. See Hearings on H.R. 6715 
before the Sen. Comm. on Finance, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 7, 57 
(1924) (statement of A. W. Gregg, Special Ass't to Treasury, 
"complications come primarily from a complicated policy," in-
cluding reorganizations. " [T)he bill will cover a given case 
definitely and certainly. Under the existing law there are hun-
dreds of cases where nobody knows the effect of the transaction 
upon Ihe tax . This law is definite enough so that the taxpayers 
will be able to tell the effect of a given transaction .. .. "), 
reprinted in 2 1909-1950 legislative Histories. 
" Brown, supra note 24, at 1619; Whitman , supra note 8, at 
1198k and note 11, at 1200. 
3' Gregory v. Commissioner, 27 B.T. A. 223 (1932), rev 'd 69 F.2d 
809 (2d Cir. 1934), aff'd 293 U.S. 465 (1935) . 
35Wh itman, supra note 9, at 1200. 
" Prel iminary Report of a House Ways & Means Subcommittee, 
"Prevention of Tax Avoidance," 73d Cong., 2d Sess . 8-9 (Comm. 
Print 1933), reprinted in 100 1909-1950 legislative Histories. 
3'Wh itman, supra note 9, at 1200-01; Schneider, "I nternal 
Revenue Code Section 355 Before and After the Tax Reform Act 
of 1986: A Study in the Regu lation of Corporate Tax Bailouts," 
39 Ok la. L. Rev. 567, 581 (1986). 
3SSee Treas. reg . 86, art. 112(g)-3 (1935), reprinted in 140 1909-
1950 Legislative Histories ; Spangler v. Commissioner, 18 T.C. 
976 (1952). 
3969 F.2d 809 (2d Cir. 1934). 
'°293 U.S. 465, 469-70 (1935). 
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in the reorganization area was the impetus for the divis ive 
reorganization provision 's specific detailed ru les. Con-
gress acted with a view that courts woul d not add new 
conditions to the statute," on the theory that detailed 
rules lessen the decis ion maker's discretion. Conse-
quently, the 1951 predecessor of section 355 contained 
an active business requirement and a device restriction . 
The requ irement of continued act ive conduct of a trade 
or business was designed to preclude a transitory bus i-
ness from qualifying for tax deferral. Arguab ly, the device 
clause was intended by Congress in 1951 (or at least by 
the House in 1948) to supersede judicial business purpose 
and continuity of interest doctrines, but this orig inal 
intent was not to be fu Ifilled . 42 
Manifest congressional antipathy to judicial 
innovations in the reorganization area was the 
impetus for the divisive reorganization provi-
sion's specific detailed rules. 
The House dratt of the 1954 Code proposed an exclu -
sive asset characterization test for tax-free corporate 
separations. A 10-year ordinary income "taint" would be 
placed upon separated stock in an " inactive" corporation. 
To avoid this characterization, a separated corporation 
had (1) to have been engaged in an " active business" f or 
five years prior to the separation, (2) to have maintained 
separate books from the retained business, and (3) to 
have passed an active business income test (not more 
than 20 percent passive income).'3 Because cautiou s 
Republicans still were in control of both Houses 01 
Congress," the Senate and Conference bills retained th e 
1951 format of not permitting tax-free separations of an 
existing corporation into act ive and inactive entities. The 
Senate criticized a 10-year taint as permitting "a person 
in a posit ion to afford a 1 O-year delay in receivi ng income 
to do so at capital gain rather than dividend rates ."45 
Section 355 of the 1954 Code requ i res (a) that the 
resulting corporations engage in the act ive conduct of a 
" Whitman, supra note 8, at 1203-03. 
" The busi ness purpose and continu ity of interest requ iremenl 
have appeared in every version of the corporate division regu la· 
tions from 1953 through 1989. Compare Treas. reg . 118, section 
39.112(b)(11 )-1 (b) (1953), with rev ised Treas. reg . sections 1.355-
2(b) and (e) (1989) . 
" H.R. Rep. No. 1337. 83d Cong .. 2d Sess. A122 (1954), 
reprinted in I Internal Revenue Acts of the United States: The 
Revenue Act of 1954 with Legislative Histories and Congressional 
Documents (Bernard D. Reams, ed. 19B2) ("1954 Code Legisl a-
tive History") . 
" Former Commissioner Sheldon Cohen, who served as start 
in the drafting of the 1954 Code, once told me that the Repu b· 
lican-controlled Senate Finance Committee rejected innovative 
and, hence, controversial approaches in 1954 because it feared 
they could drag the bill to the next term when the Democrats 
might gain control of the Senate and the Committee. See also 
Darrell, "Internal Revenue Code of 1954- A Striking Example or 
the Legislative Process in Action ," 1955 So. Cal. Tax Ins!. 1, 12-
15. They did and the Republicans have never controlled bolh 
Houses of Congress since. 
'5S. Rep. No. 1622, 83d Cong ., 2d . Sess. 51 (1954). reprinted in 
21954 Code Leg is lative History. 
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trade or business immed iate ly after the div is ion which 
bu sin ess had not been acquired in a recognition transac-
tion during a five- year look back , and (b) that the transac-
tion not have bee n used principally as a device for the 
di str ibut ion of earnings and profits, (The two o ther statu-
tory requirements are not relevant to this article .) Con-
gress enacted general requirements , but the active busi -
ness c lau se wa s more defin it ional and the device clause 
more policy orien ted, 
B. The Regulatory Factors 
1. Introduction 
a. The Device Restriction . A com mon 1954 Code tax 
planning technique consisted of accumu lating income 
in side a close ly held corporation , and then bailing out 
that accumu lat ion at shareholder- level capital gains rates 
with no furth er insi de corporate tax on a liquidation 
govern ed by th e General Utilities rule, or the death of th e 
shareholder,'6 This device was mot ivated by extremely 
hig h in dividual income tax rates , much lower corporate 
inc ome tax rates , low capital gains rates, and the codified 
General Utilities ru le. A witness at House Ways and 
Means Committee Chairman Wilbur M i lls ' 1958 Hearings 
on General Revenue Revision stated that use of graduated 
brackets by close C corporations to retai n earn i ng s 
usually taxed at 30 to 45 percent of th e maximum individ-
ual marginal rate rendered " [t)h e high ra tes that our tax 
laws now have for indi viduals . .. simply a facade."47 Trea-
su ry had sugges ted meeting th is problem by tax ing 
corporations as pass thrOlJgh entities more than 40 years 
before ,'" 
"'Panel Discuss ions, supra note 19, at 887-89 (co lloquy be-
tween Chairman Mills and Hugh Calk ins); Lewis, "A Proposed 
New Treatment for Corporate Dist ributi ons and Sales in Liquida· 
tion," 3 Tax Rev ision Compend ium 1643 (1960), reprinted in 14 
1953-1 972 Legi slative His tori es, See Lee, supra , 8 Va, Tax Rev, at 
95 and n. 141,99, and 101 , 
'''Hearings on General Revenue Revision before the House 
Comm , on Ways and Means, 85th Cong " 2d Sess, (Part 2) 3443 
(1958) (statement of Paul Ziffren , Esq .), reprinted in 10 Internal 
Revenue Acts of the United States : Revenu e Acts of 1953- 1972 
with Legis lati ve Histor ies, Laws & Congress ional Documents 
(BernMd D, Reams , Jr., ed, 1985) (" 1953-1972 Leg islat ive His-
tories"), See also Hea ring s on H,R, 13511 (Revenue Act of 1978) 
Before the Se nate Finance Comm " 95th Cong " 2d Sess, (Part 1) 
136 (1978) (statement of Sec reta ry of Treas ury Blu menthal) 
("We think that this gradClat ion at the bottom is rea lly what has 
been re ferred to in the lite rature as th e ultimate tax haven or 
shelter for a high-i ncome individual") reprinted in 5 Tax Reform, 
1978 " A Leg islative History of the Revenue Act of 1978" (ed ited 
by Va nderbi lt University Law Library Sta ff 1978), 
"Treasury staff had shown the way to a remedy as ea rly as 
1919 treating co rporations as partne rships for tax purposes. 
Treasu ry contemp lated cu rren tl y taxing owners on und istributed 
entily-Ievel net income of "a ll co rporations whose principal 
stock holders regu larly devote their ch ief time and attention to 
the act ive conduct of the affairs of th e corporati on , .. it might 
also be expedient to requ ire . . , the principal stockho lders to 
own. , say 85 perce nt [of the stock], an d to place a lim it , say 
10, upon the number of shareholders not regu lar ly devot ing th ei r 
ch ief ti me and attent ion to the active con duct of the affairs of the 
persona l corpora ti on ," Treas . Dept" " Notes on the Revenue Act 
of 1918," 66th Cong. , 1st Sess. 5-7 (1919) , reprinted in 941909-
1950 Legislative Histor ies, When the opportunity first arose to 
implemen t this policy, Treas ury fl inched . See Hear in gs on H.R. 
8245, supra note 31 , at 9- 15, 68-69, 71-72, 210-17, 244-46, 262-
66, a n(1 333-35, 
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Section 355's active busi ness test and device restriction 
were designed to thwart a " bailout" through sale of 
accumulated assets held in a separate corporation by 
shareholders who continued to hold interests in the 
parent corporation with undiminished operating assets , 
Courts had fashi oned the free-floating business purpose 
requirement in Gregory to thwart just this sort of at-
tempted bailout. The Supreme Court also fashioned the 
"continu ity of interest" doctrine , which requires a sub-
stantial continuation of equity interests in the post-
reorganizat ion corporation(s) by the hi stor ic pre-reorga-
nization shareholders 49 Immediate sale of all of th e stock 
in one of the post-division corporations, as in Gregory, 
also would violate this doctrine , 
b, Evolution of Regulatory Approach. The section 
355 regulations promulgated in 1955 re lied primari ly 
upon a definitional act ive business test to police poten ti al 
bailouts, as manifested by its order in the regulations and 
comparative development of detail. They placed th e de-
vice provision next and effectively limited it to (1) divis ions 
of corporations with heavy concentrations of non-f ive-
year active business assets and (2) post-div is ion sales . 
The backstop to these requirements was the otherwise 
undefined general reorganization business purpose and 
continuity of interest requirements . The examples lim ited 
discussion to the active business requi rement. Furth er-
more, many of the active business examples went beyond 
the generalization in text , thus often raising as m any 
questions as they answered sD 
The Tax Court in Coady 51 inval idated the pre-div ision 
separate business requirement of the 1955 regulations as 
going beyond the purpose of the statute. Two circuits 
agreed ,52 and the Serv ice capitulated , prom is ing to revise 
the regulations by el iminating th e pre-d ivi sion separa te 
active business requiremen t,53 Whitman advocated re-
struc turing the regu lations by re ly ing primarily on the 
device standard, w ithout limit in g glosses, while diminish-
ing the importance of the active business, busin ess 
purpose, and continuity of interest tests , He argued for 
permitting divisions of both functions of an integrated 
business (functi onal divisions) and branch es o r even 
compone nt s of a singl e business (vertica l divi sions), 5.\ 
The First Circuit in RaffertyS5 adopted Whitman 's argu-
ments to justi fy separation of a large hotel chain by 
functions such as land purchasing , construction , hotel 
manag ement , and leas ing divi sions , in dictum , 
"See, e,g" Pme//as Ice Co, v, CommiSSIOner, 287 U,S. 462 
(1933); Faber, "Con tinu ity of I nterest and Bu siness Enterpr ise: Is 
II Time to Bury Some Sacred Cows?," 34 Ta x Law 239 (1981) , 
lOTreas. reg . sections 1.355-1 (d)(5), (10), (11) , (12) , and (16) 
(1955) , See generally Massee, "Sec tion 355: Di sposa l of Un-
wanted Assets in Conn ection with a Reo rgan ization, " 22 Tax L, 
Rev , 439, 461-64 (1967). 
" Coady v. Commissioner, 35 T.C. 771 . 777 (1960) , nonacq. 
Rev Rul. 61 · 198, 1961-2 C,B, 61, n onacq, revoked, Rev, Rul. 64-
147, 1964-1 G.B. (Part 1) 139, aff 'd per curiam , 289 F,2d 490 (6th 
Ci r, 1961). 
" 289 F,2d 490 (6th Ci r, 1961 ); accord, United States v, Marre tt , 
325 F,2d 28 (5th Cir. 1963) . 
" Rev. Ru!. 64-147, supra note 51 , 
" Whit man, supra note 8. 
" Rafferty v. Commissioner, 452 F.2d 767 (1st CiL 197 1), cer !. 
denied, 408 U.S, 922 (1972) . 
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In 1977 Treasury and the Service proposed reviSions to 
the section 355 regulations which adopted the core of the 
Rafferty approach , but which lacked some of the finer 
details.56 The 1977 proposed amend ments rearranged the 
regulation factors in the fo llowing new order: business 
purpose, continuity of interest, device , and active busi-
nessY The ac tive business portion of the 1977 proposals 
dropped the pre-division sepa rate active business re-
quirement and substantially rewrote the accompanying 
examples, which still extended beyond the generalizations 
in text in a few instances.58 The 1977 proposed revisions 
of the device prov ision elaborated the princip les in text 
both as to subsequent sa les and use of assets and added 
two examples. 59 There was scant modification of the 
business purpose test except for a refere nce to co-
ex tens ive sha reholder business purpose and four busi-
ness purpose examples 60 The 1977 proposals continu ed 
the m re reference to th e continuity of interest doctrine 
with no exa mpl es. s1 Th e examples that were prov id ed to 
ex plain th e devic e restric tion often raised more questions 
than they answered .52 
The 1989 final regulations are a paradigmatic 
fusion of rules and standards implemented 
through factors that closely relate to the under-
lying policy or standard. 
As th e product of long ad min istrative exper ience with 
sec tion 355, the 1989 fi nal reg ulations are a parad ig matic 
fu sion o f rules and standards im p lemented throug h fac-
tors that close ly relate to the underlying po licy or stan -
dard . De-emphasis of the active business test and the 
predominant weight given to the functi ona l device stan -
dard continues from 1977 the proposa ls.G3 But this time, 
the regulation drafters implemented the device standard 
through a balancing of non-per se factors evidencing 
device with factors evidencing non-device, including busi-
ness purpose, tested against the underlying standard of 
preventing bailouts .s4 Addit ionall y , a nondividend equiva-
" See Lee, "Proposed Regs. Under 355 Overhaul DeVice Test 
and Sing le-Business Divisions," 46 J. Tax. 194 (1977). 
" Prop. Treas. reg . sections 1.355-2(b} and (c) , and -3 (1977) . 
'· Compare Treas. reg . section 1.355-1 (a) (1955) (first sentence) 
with Prop. Treas. reg. section 1.355-3{a){ I)(i} (1989). See , e.g., 
Prop. Treas. reg. section 1.355-3(c). Ex. (5) (what if no net 
lease), Ex . (7) (what if continued relationsh ip as to warehouse 
and delivery services) . Ex. (12) (what if in same business, but not 
operated as unit, or what if expansion through purchase of 
ongoing concern and not se lf-construction), Ex. (13) (what if not 
net lease). Ex . (14) (what if secondary business sells. etc., on ly 
to related company) (1977) . 
'·Prop Treas. reg . sections 1.355-2(c)(2). (3). and (4) (1977) . 
""Prop. Treas. reg . section 1.355-3(b)(2) Ex s. (1977). 
· ' Id. sec ti on 1.355-2(b)(I) . 
62 Prop. Treas. reg . section 1.355-2(c)( 4) (1977). 
" Again, the order in the regulations appears to be roughly 
from greater to lesser importance. Treas. reg. sections 1.355-
2{b), (c), and (d), and (2) (1989) . 
64 1d. secti ons 1.355-2(d)(2) and (3) . 
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lency test or "escape hatch " ord in ar ily trumps any device 
factors .65 Moreover, the drafters provided instruct ions as 
the weighing process.S6 The active business test has been 
clarified and simpl if ied in spotsY The 1989 regulations 
rely heav ily on a clarif ied business purpose requirement 
to deny tax deferra l to undeserving transact ions that do 
not ot herwise vio late the device restriction .66 The con-
tinuity of business interest requirement also has been 
strengthened in an effort to get at th ese transactions.69 
The 1989 final regulations increase the number and 
quality o f examples for every aspect of the regulations 
and often exp lain in the " Preamble" the ra ti ona le of the 
furth er examp les .?O Moreover, the text great ly expands 
the general pri nCiples , particularly as to the business 
purpose and device provisions, and the accompanying 
examples often refer to the app licable principle All in al l, 
this process constitutes a major step in the maturity of 
regulation drafting, thro ugh lessen ing the age ncy's un-
bridled discret ion in favor of structured discretion . 
2. Active Business Rule 
a. 1955 Regulation and Coady Rejection , The 1955 
regulations gave priority to the active busi ness require-
ment. The first sentence of those regu lations prohibited 
tax-free division of a singl e business . Active business was 
defined in detail, with 16 examples tha t often contain 
cryptic facts without accompany ing pr inciples in th e text 
of the regu lat ions, wh ich Professor Davis commends as a 
first step when an agency is as yet unsure o f the most 
practicable rule or standard to use. ?1 It is c lear that the 
reg ulati on drafters chose the active business test, and in 
particular the req uireme nt of at leas t two active busi-
nesses , as the primary barrier to bailout corporate 
divisions. This conc lusion is confirmed in the eyes of 
Whitman and others by the Service's ear ly revenue rulings 
under section 355, which principally relied on the ac tive 
bu siness test. The Serv ice's use of the device provision 
was li mited to finding dividend equiva lency w ith the 
primary focus on post-separation sa les . The Service 
apparently relied equal ly on business purpose and con-
tinu ity of interest. 72 
Probably re flecting th e Commissioner's deliberate liti-
gat ing stance, the early corporate divi sion case law under 
"" d . secti on 1.355-3(d)(5) 
"o ld. sections 1.355-2(d)(2)(ii). (ii i)(A). (3)( ii ), (4) Exs. (2), (3) 
"' Id. secti on 1.355-3. 
" Id. secti on 1-355-2(b) . 
" Id. secti on 1.355-2(c) Already commen tators have scored 
the cont inuity prov iSions of the revised regu lations. Willens, 
Mas on & Choate, "The Fin al Section 355 Regulat ions." 20 Tax 
Advi ser 22 1, 223 (1989) (fail ure to deal with wh en a new 
sharehol der's in terest ripens into a hi stO ri C interest "appears to 
be Ihe most glaring defect" ). 
'O Se e, e.g., "Corporate Separations : Inco me Taxes. Supple-
menta ry Information, " 54 Fed . Reg. 283, 285. 287, 288 (Ja n. 5, 
1989) ("Preamble"). 
"Davis, supra note 11 , at 60 (a ru le can be lim ited to reso lv ing 
one or more hypothetical cases Without ge neraliZing) . Th e lirst 
step is to invent ru les, as by pflvate leiter rulin gs . as problems 
arise until a body of rules can be fashioned . Id. at 15- t 7, 219. See 
Preamble, supra at 54 Fed. Reg. 285 (continu it y examples based 
on Revenue Rulings). 
" Rev. Ru l 64 -102, 1964-1 C. B. pI. 1 at 136: Whi lman. supra 
note 9. at 121 1. 1215-16. 1234-37, 1239-45: accord Lee. supra 
note 30. at 474-77. 
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the 1939 and 1954 Codes predominantly involved owner-
occupied real estate, then as now a likely candidate for a 
device,lJ but the cases turned on active business. 74 T he 
Treasury's ru le-oriented approach to the active business 
test generated a functional response. This is a frequent if 
not inevitable pattern in the tax case law which often 
produces functional-definitional conflicts, that is , stan-
dard-ru le conflicts that dest roy the certainty and predicta-
bility of a definitional tesUS The Tax Court in Coady v. 
Commissioner7" considered a non pro rata vertical div i-
sion of a single bus iness between feuding equal share-
holders. A finding that it was a device for distribution of 
earnings was implausible because the post-distribution 
corporations were not under common ownership. Both 
pos t-distribution corporations were actively conducting 
a trade or bu siness . Congress clearly meant to al low tax 
deferra l for this transaction. 77 However, the 1955 regula-
tions' two-bus iness rule under the active business test 
prohib ited both vertical and functiona l d ivisions of a 
Single busi ness. 
The early corporate divis/on case law under 
the 1939 and 1954 Codes predominantly in-
volved owner-occupied real estate . ... 
The Tax Court majority in Coady looked to the stan-
dard or policy under lying the act ive business rule, which 
is prohibition of tax-free separation of a corporation into 
active and inact ive entities. 7• Skillfully parsing the statute 
to focus on active entities , each active ly conducting a 
five-year-old trade or business, even if it had been a 
si ng le trade or business prior to the division, the Coady 
major ity iqnored other rule-oriented legislative history 
'Pream bl e. supra at 288 ("separation of owner-occupied real 
estate wi ll be subject to careful scrutiny under the active busi-
ness requ irements. Also, such a separation may be subject to 
close examinat ion under the related function device factors .. . "). 
" See. e.g., Bondy v. Commissioner, 269 F.2d 463 (4th Cir. 
1959) : Wilk ins v. United States, 188 F. Supp. 91 (So. D. III . 1960); 
Appleby v. Commissioner, 35 T.C. 755, 764 (1961), aft'd, 296 F.2d 
925 (3d Cir.): cert. denied, 370 U.S. 910 (1962); Elliott v. Commis-
sioner. 32 T.C. 283 (1959) . See generally, Massee, "Section 355: 
Disposal of Unwanted Assets in Connection with a Reorganiza-
tion ." 22 Tax L. Rev . 439, 457-59 (1967) . 
" See passages cited in note 10 as to conflicts in start-up and 
bUSiness expansion areas. I am currently writing an article on 
Rojas v. Commissioner. 90 T.C . 1090 (1988), on appeal to the 
Ninth Circ uit. which in part exp lores such a dialectic under the 
tax benef it rule. I had just read Shaviro's application of the "well 
known dichotomy between rules and standards as tools of 
substantive law" (see Shaviro, supra note 15), and the same 
dichotomy lea pt from the first reading of the 1989 regulat ions. 
';'33 T.C. 77 1 (1960), nonacq. Rev. Rul. 61-198, 1961-2 C.B. 
(Part 2) 136, aff 'd per curiam, 289 F.2d 490 (6th Cir. 1961). 
" See IRC sect ion 355(a)(2)(A) ; Whitman , supra note 9, at 
1209. 
" 33 T.C. at 777-79. 
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which supported the two-bus iness requirement. 79 After 
finding that the active trade or business requirement was 
met, the majority readily found no device, since the two 
feudi ng shareholders had no in terest in the other's post-
distribution entity. The Coady majority probably rejected 
the separate act ive bus iness rule because it was overin-
clusive, encompassing transactions that are not condu-
cive to device.ao 
The First Circuit ... took the opportunity to 
attack, in dictum, the 1955 regulations ' prohibi-
tion of functional divisions of an integrated 
business. 
The Treasury's overreliance on the active business test 
and its limitation of the device restriction to post-distri-
bution sales opened up a gaping loophole arising from 
the underinclusive nature of the active business test. A 
Coady-like vert ical division of a single actively conducted 
business which was readi ly saleable could be accom-
plished w ithout tax even if the distribution was pro rata. 
Taxpayers easily could meet the active business, busi-
ness purpose, and continuity of interest tests and the 
limited device restriction . This was arguably the result in 
United States v. Marett,· ' which involved a pro rata 
vertical division. Possibly recognizing the danger posed 
by the Marett fact pattern-after a three-year wait, a post-
division corporation could be sold to effect a bailout- the 
Service acquiesced in 1964 to Coady and Marett, an-
nouncing the future revision of section 355 regulations.82 
b . Whitman's Vision and the Rafferty Response. The 
Service's delay in this revision invited critical commen-
tarY, 83 but permitted further incremental development of 
rules through letter and publ ic rulings . This process 
constitutes an inherent advantage to agency "rule 
making" as contrasted with legislative or even j udicial-
" Compare 33 T.C. at 776-779 with 783-84. See generally 
Whitman , supra note 9, at 1212-12 and n. 92 and 1214 n. 99 
(Coady majority properly " fudged" the separate business issue 
with "shady use" of legislative history) . 
" Whitman, supra note 9, at 1214. 
· '325 F.2d 28 (5th Cir. 1963). Twenty years ago, Professor 
Peter Weidenbruch taught me in the LLM program at Georgetown 
Law Center about this unwarranted extension tendency of the 
(tax) case law, which I have since traced in other tax law 
contexts. See, e.g., Lee & Bader, "Contingent Income Items and 
Cost Basis Corporate Acquisitions : Correlative Adjustments and 
Clearer Reflection of Income: ' 12 J. Corp. L. 137-207 and n. 439 
(1987) . He also led us through the 1955 regulations with problems 
and via his syllabus introduced me to the significance, and often 
richness, of secondary tax literature. What more could you ask 
of a teacher and mentor? 
·' Rev. Rul. 64-147 , 1964-1 C.B. (Part 1) 136. 
·' The following secondary authorities strongly shaped my 
article on Rafferty. supra note 30: Whitman , supra note 8. 
Jacobs, "The Anatomy of a Spin-Off, " 1967 Duke l. J. 1; Massee. 
supra note 50; Biltker & Eustice, "Federal Taxat ion of Corpora-
tions and Shareholders" (2d ed. 1966) 
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line draw ing. according to Professor Davis '"4 Whitman. 
focus ing on the rule-standard dichotomy - wh ich he ar-
ticulated as definitional (active business) versus trans-
act iona l (dev ice) provisions"-advocated diminishing the 
rol e o f th e active bu siness test as well as the business 
purpose and continuity of interest. Whitman argued that 
th e device restriction should be a standard, t o be used for 
dete rmining whether the transaction was worthy of tax 
deferra l, 
The Tax Court in Rafferty had found no active busi-
ness, B6 The First Circuit agreed. but took the opportunity 
to attack, in dictum, the 1955 regulations' prohibition of 
functiona l divisions of an integra ted business ."' The co urt 
ad o pt ed a functional standard for defining active busi-
ness, The " corporation must engage in entrep ren eurial 
e nd eavo rs of such a nature and to such an extent as to 
qua lit ative ly distinguish its operations from mere invest-
ments, Moreover , there should be objective indicia of 
such corporate operations ."88 In 1975, the Service an-
nounced that it would fo ll ow Rafferty , and approved 
functional div is ions of an integrated business ,B9 
c . The 1977 Proposed Amendments. In 1977 Trea-
sury proposed extensive revisions to the sect ion 355 
regu lati o n s. Th e 1977 proposed regulations were a major 
ste p in the evolution from ru les to structured discretion 
through standards implemented with a ru le-standard 
fusion , The Prea mble announced two major changes 
from 1955 reg ulations: (1) revision of the device provision 
" to d esc rib e factor s which are to be taken int o account in 
making th e determination of whether a transaction was a 
'device' ," and (2) revi si on of the ac t ive bus iness rule to 
provid e for th e separation of a s ing le business consistent 
with Coady and Marett ,90 eliminating the ir ove rin clus ive 
feature. Th e revisions adopted much of the sp i rit o f the 
Rafferty-Whitman approach , albeit not the letter of the 
cases. For instance, the proposed revisions reordered the 
rules, placing bu siness purpose and continuity of interest 
first and device second ahead of the active business rules 
in th e regulations 91 (Thi s order is maintained in th e 1989 
f inal revis ions of th e secti on 355 regulations 92) 
Thi s impli cit downgrad ing of the act ive busin ess test in 
th e ordering of the regulation provisions is borne out by 
the liberali zation regarding functio nal div isions under the 
active b us in ess tes t. Th e drafters ex p li ci tly relied on th e 
" Dav is, supra note 11 . at 16, 60, and 219, and 38-39 , 
"'Whitman. supra note 8, at 121 1, see also id. at 1215- 16, 1227, 
1252-53. 
'655 T ,C, 490, 499 (1970) . aff'd on ocher grounds, 452 F.2d 767 
(1st Cir , 1971) , cer /, denied 408 U.S. 922 (1972) 
" 452 F.2d at 772 nn, 10 and 12. See generally Lee, supra, 27 
Tax L Rev. at 457-58, 473. 
"'452 F.2d at 772-73; see generally Lee , supra, 27b Tax L Rev , 
at 462-66. 
" Rev , Rul . 75- 160, 1975- 1 G.B. 11 2. To my sad ex perience. I 
discovered sho rtl y th ereaf te r that they would not rul e on a pro-
posed pro rata separation of owner-occup ied rea l esta te with a 
co ntinued rela tion ship with the light manufacturing co rporation 
in whi ch employees could invest after the pro posed di vis ion , 
Who but Professor Mar tin Gin sburg would have tllOUght of 
alphabet or 'subsidiary tracking" stock as a better solution? 
90Preamble , 42 Fed . Reg 2694 (Jan , 1977) 
" See note 57 , supra, and accom panying text. 
''' 'See note 63, supra, 
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related funct ion test of an enhanced device res tric t ion, " 
Thi s shift from active bus iness to dev ice was nol exte nded 
to owner-occupied realty , where the drafters' chief wor ry 
was "net- leasing .""' T he active business tes t also imp liCit ly 
adopted a Rafferty-d erived functi o nal definition of "S ign if-
icant operational and manag ement services .""" Whil e the 
1977 proposa ls provid ed num erou s active bu s iness ex-
am ples, sometimes reversing the 1955 examples, all 100 
ofte n the examples gave cryptic s ignals without genera li-
zations in the texp 6 
d. The Active Business Test: 1989 Version. The 1989 
revised regulations ' treatment of the active bu s iness test 
essentia ll y fol low the bas ic thru s t of the 1977 proposals, 
The final regulations permit both vertical"' and horizonta l 
division s, subject ing th e latter to the re lated fun c ti o n rule 
of the dev ice provi sions .98 
The new regulations also address the trouble-
some issue of corporate expansion upon which 
the case law had split. 
Fortunatel y, th e final revi sed regu lation s address a 
number of active business issues whi ch the 1977 pro-
posa ls fai led to cons ider For exa mple, in 8cco rdancc 
with ear lier ruling s, th e 1989 revi sio ns require the corpo-
ration itself generally to perform active and subs tanti al 
manage ment and operat ional functi ons .9" The new I'egula-
9J Compa re Prop, Treas . r g. sec tio n 1.355-2(c)(3)( lv) I idst Iwo 
sen tences) and id. sec ti on 1355-3(c) Exs. (8). (9), an d ( 1~ 1 With 
Treas . reg sec tion 1. 355- 1(c) Ex s. (5) , (11), (12),and (16) ( 19551 . 
See generally Lee , "Proposed Reg s, Under 355 Overhau l /)ev ;cc 
Test and Single Bu siness Divi sions ," 46 J. Tax . 194, 195-96 .1 98 
·'Prop. Treas. reg, sections 1 ,355-3(b)(2)(i i i) (B) and 31c) Exs . 
(4 ), (5), and (13) (1977); see Lee, supra, 46 J. 1 ax ,11 198 
(sug gest ing more focu s on device- re lated function) . 
·'Prop. Treas. reg , sect ion 1,355-3(b)(2)(i ii) . 
· ·See Lee. supra 46 J , Tax . at 198-99 , Helfand & Lalv lng , 
" Fi ll ing th e Serbonian Bog with Qui cksand- Proposed Secti on 
355 Regulat ions Further Obscure Corporate Separati ons, Par t 
3," 6 J. Corp. Tax'n. 133, 141 -42, 146-52 (1979) ("Helfand & 
Lavfing (part 3) " ). 
" Preamb le, supra , 54 Fed . Reg . 288; T reas, reg , sectio n 1 .35 ~ -
3(b)(3)(i) (1989) 
' Bld. sect ion 1.355-3(c) Exs. (9), (10), and (11) (1989) , Nole In 
exa mpl es cross references (a) to regu lation provis ion cit ed in n 
97 , supra, and (b) to " related fu nction " com ponent of the 
regu lations devi ce test. Note that the examples invo lving separ a-
tion of partially owned-occup ied rea l estate do not fo l low ttl is 
approach; id. Exs. (12) and (13) . Indeed, the Service forthrrghtl y 
acknowl edges in Exmaple 13 th at the exam ple " does not ad-
dress" whether pre-separation activities as to a bu ild ing 175 
percent owner-use in business and 25 percent leased as sto rage 
to another perso n) wou ld constitute the ac tive conduct of a 
t rade or business during the five-yea r lookback . Such openness 
const itutes a quantu m leap over th e earl ier tec hniq ue of drafti ng 
examples by innuendo, 
99Treas, reg , section 1.355-3(b)(iii) (1989) See Lee, supra 46 
J. Tax at 199; Lee, " Th e 'Act ive Bus iness' Test of Secti on 355 
Impl ications of a Trilogy of Revenue RU li ngs ," 31 WaSh, & Lee L. 
Rev. 251 (1974). 
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tions also address the troublesome issue of corporate 
expansion upon which the case law had split.' oo The regu-
lation drafters chose the more liberal and administrable 
approach , as expla ined in the Preamble. '0 ' 
The drafters chose the rule that purchase, creation , or 
other acquis it ion of another trade or business in the same 
line as an existi ng trade or business is treated as an 
expansion o f the original business unless this purchase , 
creation , or other acquisition affects such a change of 
character as to constitute the acqu isiti on of a new or 
different businessw2 The active business examples were 
revised to ref lect this change and to flesh out the generali -
zat ion in text. ' 03 Moreover, the excellent preamble to the 
revised regu lations spells out the reasoning under ly in g 
the examples ,'o. a welcome development in regulation 
drafting. 
Following the structured discretion shown in the revised 
regulations, the 1989 regulat ions also properly point out 
that the separation of owner-occupied real estate will be 
subject to careful scrutiny under the act ive business 
requirements because this separation, although it could 
satisfy the active business requirement, presents signifi-
cant tax avoidance opportunities. '05 Even if this separation 
survives special scrutiny under the active bus iness test, 
the pream ble and the reg ulations point out that it may be 
subject to close examination under the related function 
device test where the rea l estate continues to be occupied 
by the previous owner. 106 The Preamble also mentions, 
but does not resolve, other longstanding problems raised 
by the distribution of an entity holding owner-occupied 
real estate. 107 
The active business provisions of the 1955 regu lations, 
the 1977 proposed amendments, and the 1989 revised 
regulation s all have made commendable and progres-
sively more sophisticated use of examples in illustrating 
the general p rinc ip les. There has been a welcome evolu -
tion in explanation of the general pri nc iples beh ind the 
'OOCompare Lockwood's Es tate v. Commissioner, 350 F.2d 712 
(8th Ci r. 1965), with Nielsen v. Commissioner, 61 T.C. 311 
(1973) . See genera lly, Halfand & Lafving, Part 3, supra note 96, 
at 140-43. 
lO' [I]n reexamining the active business requirement , Treasury 
and the In ternal Revenue Service recognized that it is often 
difficult to determine whether a corporation is conducting a 
single business , which may be separated under section 355 if it 
has been active ly conducted for five years, or multiple busi-
nesses, which may be separated from each other under sect ion 
355 only if each has been actively conducted for five years . 
Correlatively. they recognized that it is difficult to determine 
whether a corporate expenditure for a new activity const itutes a 
new business or the ex pansion of an existing business. Accord-
ingly, it is cons id ered appropriate to simplify these determi-
nations. Preamble, supra, 54 Fed. Reg. at 288. 
'O'Treas. reg . section 1.355-3(b)(3)(ii) (1989) . 
IO' /d. secti on 1.355-3(c) Exs . (7) and (8) . 
IO'Preamble, supra, 54 Fed . Reg . at 288 ("same bus iness 
principle applies regardless of whether (a) old and new compo-
nents operated as sing le unit, and (b) new component resul ted 
from interna l expansion or purchase as a going concern) . See 
Lee, supra , 46 J . Tax. at 199, for implications of 1977 examples. 
,o' /d. at 288; see Schneider, supra note 37, at 592, n. 141 . 
'o·Preamble. supra, 54 Fed . Reg. at 288. 
\oT/d. at 289, Treas. reg . section 1.355-3(c) (Ex. (13) (1989) (l ast 
sentence) . 
1038 
examples; factual patterns are distinguished, and un-
answered questions are noted . 
3. Device Restriction 
a. The 1955 Version and Criticism. Th e 1955 regula-
tions focused the search for device on post-distribution 
sales, articulating confusing distinctions based on 
whether the sa le was arranged prior to the corporate 
separat ion. loa While they stated that particular considera-
tion would be given in applying a facls-and-circumstances 
device test to the nature, kind, and amount of assets, the 
only guidance that the 1955 regulatio ns provided was a 
positive implication of no device where substantially all 
t he assets of the post-division corporations had been 
used ina five-year active busi ness. '0 9 The Service i nter-
preted the device test as a dividend equivalency test , thus 
providing a safe harbor for substantially non pro rata 
divisions. li D 
In Rafferty v. Commissioner, ... the . .. transac-
tion clearly [was] not worthy of tax deferral. 
Whitman criticized this diminution of device. He advo-
cated that the device restriction be raised to a standard , 
asking whether the transaction was worthy of tax deferral. 
In Rafferty v. Commissioner,' " the First Circuit seized the 
opportunity to approve Whitman's proposals in a tran sac-
tion clearly not worthy of tax deferra l. There, the pro rata 
division was motivated by the sole shareholder's estate 
planning motives at best, and placed readi ly saleable real 
estate (he ld in a corporation) in the shareholder's hands. 
Th is real estate was net leased to a related corporation, 
so the tran saction failed the active business test as 
wel 1. 1I2 The First Circuit may have felt provoked by the 
Tax Court's opinion , which in part exactly paralleled the 
Treasury approach criticized by Whi t man . For the Tax 
Court in Rafferty, like the Service in general at that time, 
had devalued the device test by finding it satisfied by an 
adeq uate (shareho lder-level) business purpose for the 
I08Treas. reg. section 1.355-2(b)(2) (1955) ; Lee, supra , 27 Tax 
L. Rev. at 474 n. 82. 
' '"Treas. reg . section 1.355-2(b)(3) (1955); Lee, supra. 27 Tax 
L. Rev. at 475-76. 
" OSee, e.g., Rev. Ru!. 71 -593, 1971 -2 C.B. 181 ; Rev. Ru!. 64-
102, 1964-1 C.B. (Part 1) 136). 
"' 452 F.2d 767 (1st Cir. 1971). cert. denied, 408 U.S. 922 
(1972) . 
' '' In my view, the creative use of dictu m to resolve issues 
raised in the commentary , albe it not on the facts, here just as in 
Hillsboro National Bank v. Commissioner, 460 U.S. 370 (1983), is 
good opinion writing. At least as to Hillsboro, Professor Blum 
disagrees. Blum, "The Ro le of the Supreme Court in Federal In-
come Tax Controversies: Hil lsboro National Ban k and Bliss 
Dairy, Inc.," 6 Taxes 363.368 (1983) . 
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corporate separation." 3 Instead, the Tax Court relied on 
the active business test, properly finding no active busi-
ness. 
The First Circuit cited "the rule that the taxpayer has 
the burden of proving that the transaction was not used 
principally as device"-Whitman's catch ph rase for ele-
vating the device restriction to a standard.'" In imple-
menting this standard, the court formulated a balancing 
framework for determining whether the transaction is 
worthy of tax deferral : if (1) a transaction has consi derable 
potential for use as a device by placing readily saleable 
assets in an entity, and (2) sale of this entity or its assets 
would not impair the shareholder's control over the other 
continuing business entity, then (3) the taxpayer must 
show either that the shareholder's motives were germane 
to the continuance of the corporate business, or were a 
direct benefit to the business of the original corporation ." 5 
The Rafferty court preferred "this approach over reliance 
upon formulations such as 'business purpose,' and 'active 
business,' '' citing Whitman, who had called for just this 
rearrangement of the section 355 factors .116 
The failure to rank the various factors relating 
to device was the most grev;ous defect of the 
1977 proposals. 
Rafferty's fleshing out of the device standard signifi-
cantly does not entail detailed, per se rules . Some of the 
factors - particularly saleability of assets and impairment 
of equity- speak direct ly to the underlying standard of 
preventing bailouts ." 7 The balancing between bailou t 
potential and shareholder or business purposes out-
weighing this potential (by requiring retention of the 
assets) is more standard-oriented than rule-oriented. In 
effect, Rafferty provided framework for structured just ice. 
b. The 1977 Device Proposals. The device provisions 
in the 1977 proposed regulations used a mixture of per se 
and balancing factors . Prearranged subsequent sales of 
more than a specified percentage of the distributed stock 
constituted a device per 5e." 8 Apparently , either a pro 
rata distribution or the presence of assets used in a 
"'55 T.C. 490. 496. But after finding no active business as to 
the spun-off real estate corporation, the Tax Court inconsis-
tently, but correctly. concluded that the shareholder "extracted 
through an attempted tax-free spin-off what are in substance 
passive, investment-type assets. This transaction is a 'bailout' of 
the earnings and profits . . . and to this extent constitutes a 
'device' . . . . ," Citing Whitman. 55 T.C. at 500. 
"'Compare Rafferty. 452 F.2d at 769, with Whitman. supra 
note 8, at 1253. 
"'See generally Lee. "Functional Divisions and Other Corpo-
rate Separations Under Section 355 Atter Rafferty." 27 Tax L. 
Rev. 453. 489-90, 492-93, and 496 (1972) ; accord, Helfand & 
Lafving (Part 3). supra note 96, at 153. 
"6452 F.2d at 770. 
'" See Lee, supra, 27 Tax L. Rev. at 480-86. 
"3Prop. Treas. reg . section 1.355-2(c)(2) (1977) (if prearranged 
sale of 20 percent or more of stock distributed "will be considered 
to have been used principally as a device") . 
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related function constituted evidence of device"9 Two 
examples accompanied the 1977 device proposals . One 
was a simple prearranged sale of a 50 percent interest. 
The other featured a sale preceded by a distribution of 
excess cash that outweighed a corporate business pur-
pose . These examples appeared without applicable gen-
eralizations in text. '20 
The 1977 proposed amendments neither considered 
the standard of impairment of equity ca(led for in Rafferty 
nor addressed several other troublesome areas. '2' From 
the perspective of structured discretion , the failure to 
rank the various factors relating to device was the most 
grievous defect of the 1977 proposals. In Nevertheless, 
they were a commendable first step.'2J At the time, 
however, commentators were irritated by the 13-year 
delay between the promise first of revision and the arrival 
of revision of the 1955 active business regulation and the 
1977 proposed revisions.124 
C. Device: 1989 Style 
The new regulations adopt an "all of the facts and 
circumstances" test for the device standard . This is 
augmented by the required balancing of "device factors" 
with " non-device factors," which in turn is subject to an 
overriding , detailed exception for nondividend equivalent 
transactions. There is an exception to the exception if 
bailout is still facilitated . This is structured discretion. '25 
Furthermore, each set of factors and the nondividend 
equivalent exception contains internal balancing tests 
that re late back to the device standard . ,26 Add itionally, 
the new regulations instruct the decision maker to give 
shifting weight to certa in factors according to va riations 
in factual patterns within the particular category of factors 
and to shift the balance between the factors themselves.127 
Particular "hot buttons," like owner-occupied real es-
tate, '28 are isolated for particular scrutiny, instead of 
being the overarching concerns that had impaired the 
efficacy of earlier regulations. 129 
1. Device Factors. The 1989 regulations contain three 
device factors : (a) pro rata distribution, (b) a subsequent 
sale or exchange of stock, and (c) the nature and use of 
assets. '30 These factors were present in the 1977 pro-
posed revisions, but the taint of a pro rata distr ibution 
was not clearly stated. However, the 1977 proposed 
regulations had a 20 percent ceiling on the percentage of 
distributed stock that could be sold in a prearranged sa le 
1I9Prop. Treas. reg . sections 1.355-2(c)(1) and (3) . 
"Old. section 1.355-2(c)(4) . 
"'Lee, supra, 46 J . Tax . at 200. 
' 22Helfand & Latving, "Filling the Serbonian Bog with Quick-
sand: Proposed Section 355 Regulations Further Obscure Corpo-
rate Separations- Part 1," 5 J . Corp. Tax 345, 354, 367-68. 371 
(1979) . 
'23Lee. supra, 46 J. Tax. at 200. 
" 'Id. 
"'See text accompanying note 11 , supra. 
'26Treas. reg . sections 1.355-2(d)(ii) , (iv)(c) , and (5)(i) (1989) . 
I27See note 66, supra. 
1231 surmise that the importance given to the active business 
tests and especially the preeminence given the two-business re-
quirement of the 1955 regulations were directed at a blanket 
denial of section 355 to owner-occupied real estate. 
'29See Preamble. supra, 54 Fed. Reg . at 288, note 73, supra. 
" oTreas. reg . section 1.355-2(d) (1989) . 
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without automatically invoking the device restriction . 131 A 
prearranged sale of less than 20 percent of the stock or of 
secu rities was "su bstantial evidence" of use as a device. 
Sa les that were not prearranged were to be taken into 
account with other evidence in determining whether the 
transaction was used pr incipal ly as a device. 132 The final 
regulation s delete this per se ru le, treating any pre-
arranged sale as sUbstantial evidence of a device .133 In a 
quantum improvement in regulation drafting , the regu la-
tions vary the weight of evidence of device attri butable to 
a subsequent sale as follows: 
Generally , the greater the percentage of the stock 
sold or exchanged after the distribution, the 
stronger the evidence of device. In addition , the 
shorter the period of ti me between the distri bution 
and the sale or exchange, the stronger the evidence 
of device. 134 
On a technical level , the drafters of the 1989 regulations 
devoted more careful attention to post-distri bution sales 
of securities and "boot" dividends. They except these 
sa les from treatment as evidence of a device, since 
neither is amenable to a bailout due to the ordinary in-
come treatment under section 356. '35 
The final regulations ... treat . .. any prear-
ranged sale as substantial evidence of a device. 
The 1989 revisions increase the sophistication of the 
nature and use of assets factors from the 1977 proposals 
and th e 1955 regulations by taking account of the Ser-
vice's ruli ng experience and the adv ice of commenters .1J6 
The " nature, kind , and amount of the assets" test for a 
device in the 1955 regu lations focused on satisfact ion of 
the active busi ness test as evidence that the transact ion 
was not used principally as a device. m The 1977 pro-
posed regu lations focused on the presence of recently 
purchased assets or liquid assets . A device was indicated 
if a substantial portion of the assets of any post-distribu-
tion corporation consisted of trade or bus iness assets 
acquired in a cost basis transaction within the preceding 
five-year period , or there was a transfer or retention of 
cash or li quid assets unrelated to the reasonable needs of 
the bu si ness.' 38 The 1989 revisions coalesce these two 
tests into one dev ice factor. The presence of assets that 
are not used in a trade or bus iness that satisfies the five-
year predistribut ion active conduct requirement of sec-
tion 355(d) - inc ludi ng cash and other liqui d assets not 
'" Prop. Treas. reg . section 1.355-2(c}(2} (1977). 
"' Id. 
'''Treas. reg . sect ion 1.355-2(d}(2}(iii)(8} (1989). 
"' Id. section 1.355-2(d)(2}(ii i}(A} . 
"'Preamble, supra, 54 Fed . Reg . at 285; Treas. reg. section 
1.355-2(d}(iii}(E} (last sentence). 
"·Preamble , supra , 54 Fed. Reg . at 286, Citing both sources. 
J37 Treas. reg. section 1.355-2(b}(3) (1955) . 
'''Prop. Treas. reg. sections 1.355-2(c)(3)(ii) and (iii) (1977). 
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related to the reasonable needs of the busi ness- is evi-
dence of device. '39 
III ustrating more sophisticated balanci ng , the 1989 
regulations provide that the strength of the evidence of 
device depends on all facts and circumstances, includ ing 
each postdistribution corporation 's ratio of value of assets 
not used in any trade or business to the va lue of assets 
that meet the five-year active business requirement. '40 
Drawing upon ruling experience, as advocated by Profes-
sor Davis as to administrative rules in general , the 1989 
regulations state that a difference in this ratio ordinarily 
is not evidence of device if the distribution is not pro rata 
and this difference is attributable to a need to equal ize 
the va lue of the stock distributed and the stock sur-
rendered by the distributees.14 ' 
The 1977 proposals and the 1989 revised regu lations 
both include under the nature and use of assets factor the 
presence of a continuing " related function " between the 
distributed corporation and the parent corporation. "2 
The new regulations use the term "secondary business" 
for a post-distribution business with a conti nuing prinCipal 
function of serving the other post-d ivision business or an 
affiliate. This approach was Treasury's answer to the 
probl ems it saw in functional divis ions previously barred 
by the now-abandoned separate active business require-
ment. The related function test , particularly as revised in 
the final regulations, is closely related to the bailout 
problem . The new version of the related function test 
properly provides that there is no device if sale of the 
"secondary business" would adversely affect the busi -
ness of the other corporation .143 This, of course, is the 
impairment of equity test dictated by Rafferty'" 
2. Non-Device Factors. Following the suggestion of 
commenters on the 1977 proposed revis ions , the govern-
ment agreed that the corporate business purpose for a 
transaction cou ld outweig h the evidence of device pre-
sented by the transaction ."5 Rafferty mandated this ap-
proach . The 1989 regulations guide the decision maker's 
disc retion in an innovative way. 
The fina l regulations adopt a sl iding scale approach . 
Thus, the greater the evidence of device, the 
stronger the corporate business purpose necessary 
to outweigh that evidence. ,46 
Further examples of the structured discretion employed 
throughout the 1989 revis ions are contained in the non-
'39Treas . reg. section 1.355-2(d}(iv}(8) (1989). 
"O ld. sect ion 1.355-2(d}(2)( iv)(8) (1989) . 
''' Id.; Preamble , supra , 54 Fed. Reg. at 286. See Rev. Ru!. 64-
102, 1964-1 C.B. 137; Rev. Ru!. 71-383, 1971-2 C.B. 180. 
"'Compare Prop. Treas. reg . section 1.355-2 (c}(3}(iv) (1977) 
with Treas. reg . section 1.355-2(d)(2)(iv}(C) (1989) . 
''' Id. sect ion 1.355-2(d)(2) (iv)(C) (clause (i ) of the first sen-
tence) . 
'''Preamble, supra, 54 Fed . Reg . at 286. In theory, the same 
impairment of equity defense should app ly to the other two 
device factors : post -distribution sales and non-section 355(b) 
assets, except excess liquid assets . See Lee , supra, 46 J. Tax . at 
197, 200; Lee, supra , 27 Tax L. Rev . at 48 1-86. 
"'Preamble , supra , 54 Fed. Reg . at 283 and 287: Treas. reg . 
section 1.355-2(d)(3)(ii) (1989) . 
"'Preamble, 54 Fed . ReQ. at 287. 
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exclusive list of factors provided for assessing the strength 
of a corporate business purpose. 147 They establish "that 
not just any cooked up, last minute business purpose is 
enough ."" s 
The revised regu lations also include as a nondevice 
factor the fact that the distributing corporation is publicly 
traded with no shareholder owning more than five percent 
of any class of stock.'49 This per se rule avoids the 
difficulty, exposed in Golconda Mining, of determining 
whether a shareholder or group of shareholders in a 
publicly traded corporation controls it. 'sO This is the ap-
parent standard under the accumulated earnings tax for 
determining whether the shareholders in a public corpo-
ration caused it to accumulate income rather than paying 
dividends's, 
Commentators on the proposed 1977 revisions pOinted 
out that due to the dividends received deduction appli-
cable to intercorporate dividends, a distribution of stock 
in the controlled corporation to one or more domestic 
corporations would not pose a bailout opportunity (at 
least to the extent of the deduction). 152 The government 
apparently agreed by treating corporate ownership as 
not evidence of a device. '53 
'''Treas. reg . sections 1.355-2(d)(3)(ii)(A), (B), and (C) (1989) 
(importance; extent prompted by outsiders or outside, uncon-
tro llable factors ; and immediacy) . 
' ''Sheppard , "Section 355 Regulations Do Not Prevent Aggres-
sive Transaciions," 42 Tax Notes 274 (January 16, 1989). Within 
a week after publication , an IRS National Office Corporate 
Reorganization attorney used the term "not just any cooked-up 
business purpose" in a telephone conversation with me. He 
shared the story of the National Office asking the taxpayer's 
attorney for an affidavit that a key employee really wanted to buy 
stock in a post-distribution corporation and being told that the 
attorney would obtain it immediately . How could the attorney be 
so sure? "He'l l sign it or we'll fire him," the attorney replied . 
'49Treas . reg . section 1.355-2(d)(3)(iii) (1989) . 
" oThe Tax Court in Golconda Mining Corp, v. Commissioner, 
58 T.C. 139, 158 (1972), fashioned the standard for "neutra lizing" 
publ ic ownership as to whether the company was managed to 
accumulated income to avoid paying dividends. 
If the management group is dominated by a single large 
shareholder or a small group of shareholders who exercise 
effective control over the dividend policy of the company 
or the company represents itself to prospective or existing 
shareholders as an investment company with the avowed 
policy of accumulating its investment income, public 
ownership of the company becomes a less important 
factor in determining whether earnings and profits had 
been accumulated for the proscribed purpose. Id. 
The Ninth Circuit reversed the Tax Court on the factual bas is 
that shareholders who at most owned 17 percent of the stock 
(between 1,500 and 2,900 shareholders owned stock during the 
year) did not exercise such control. 507 F.2d 594, 597 (9th Cir. 
1974). In Rev. Rul. 75-305, 1975-2 C.B. 228, the Service an -
nounced it would not follow the Ninth Circuit's opinion . 
"'Since 1984, section 532(c) has provided that publiC stock 
holding alone does not exempt a corporation from the accumu-
lated earnings tax . The intended test is whether any " individual 
or small group of individuals has legal or effective control of the 
corpo ration ," Joint Comm. Staff , General Explanation of the 
Revenue Provisions of the Tax Reform Act of 1984, H .R. 4170, 
98th Cong., 2d Sess. 164 (1984) ("1984 Bluebook"). 
"2Helfand & Lafving, Part 3, supra note 96, at 372. 
'''Treas. reg . section 1.355-2( d)(3)(iv) (1989) . 
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The device portion of the 1989 regulations provides 
four much more helpful examples than the 1977 pro-
posals. The examples weigh various device factors against 
varying degrees of the corporate business purpose as a 
nondevice factor, illustrating various aspects of the busi-
ness purpose factor. '54 Moreover, each example refers to 
subsections in the text of the regulation containing the 
relevant generalizations . The Preamble culls and explains 
the determinative facts of each example and the weighing 
process.'ss No more cryptic examples here. Incidentally, 
some of the most commonly asserted business purposes 
are properly blown away, for example, sales to "valued" 
employees of a smaller post-division corporation. Under 
the nontaxable alternative rule, ' 56 other means of compen-
sation, such as stock appreCiation rights or perhaps 
compensatory alphabet stock of the parent, theoretically 
might even preclude a tax-free division based upon 
separat ing out the company employing the key employee 
in order to issue her new stock.'57 
3. Safe and Relatively Safe Harbors. The Service indi-
cated in early rulings that it considered the device restric-
tion merely a dividend equivalency test.' 58 If, in the 
absence of section 355, the transaction would have been 
taxable as capital gain to the distributee shareholder 
under section 302(a) , the distribution did not violate the 
device restriction . The Service extended the same reason-
ing to transactions in which the distributing corporation 
and the controlled or separated corporation did not have 
earnings and profits. '59 Whitman criticized the Service for 
abdicating its power to police bailouts by so limiting the 
device test. He reasoned that the Service diminished the 
importance of device in order to rely on the familiar 
reorganization judicial doctrines like business purpose 
and, implicitly, the active business test. 'SO It is more likely 
that the Service wanted to limit section 355 deferral to 
non pro rata distributions and separations in which the 
shareholders in each post-distribution corporation had 
no interest in the other corporation . A section 302(b)(3) 
dividend equivalency test seemed to do that nicely. 
The Service indicated In early rulings that it 
considered the device restriction merely a divi-
dend equivalency test. 
The 1977 proposed regulations incorporated the de-
scribed ruling experience of the Service, providing that if 
a distribution to each distributee would have been treated 
"' Id. section 1.355-2(d)(4) . 
'55Preamble , supra , 52 Fed . Reg . at 287 . 
'
56 1d, at 285; Treas. reg . sect ion 1.355-2(b)(3) (1989) (second 
sentence) . 
'''Sheppard, "Section 355 Regulations," supra note 148, at 
274. Others disagree. See Wood, " Do the Section 355 Regulations 
Go That Far? ," 43 Tax Notes 225 (April 10, 1989). Sheppard has 
further explicated her pOSition , with which I agree, in Sheppard, 
"Section 355 and BUSiness Purpose, " 43 Tax Notes 794 (May 15, 
1989). 
"·See note 72, supra; accord Rev. Rul. 71-383, 1971-2 C.B. 
180. 
'59Rev. Rul. 71-384, 1971-2 C.B. 181 . 
160S ee note 72, supra. 
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as a redemption under section 302(a) if it were taxable, 
"the transaction is ordinarily not considered to be a 
device for the distribution of earnings and profits. "'6' 
Similarly , the 1977 proposals stated that if neither the 
distributing corporation nor the controlled corporation 
had earnings and profits at the time of the distribution, 
the transaction was ordinarily not considered a device.'62 
The interrelationship of this rule with the device restriction 
was not clear. '63 
The exception which arises when there are no 
earnings and profits ... Is not available to a 
distributing corporation with built-in gains. 
The 1989 final regulations make nondividend equiva-
lency a superfactor that ordinarily outweighs-as sug-
gested by commentators '64-any device factors in a per 
S9 manner. The rationale is that the three specified 
nondividend equivalent distributions ordinarily do not 
present a potential for tax avoidance. '65 The favored three 
consist of (1) no earnings and profits in the distributing 
or controlled corporations, (2) a transaction to wh ich 
section 302(a) would apply if the transaction were taxable, 
and (3) a transact ion to which section 303(a) would apply 
if taxable .'66 The new regulations properly lift the protec-
tion of the hypothetical section 302(a) and section 303 
redemption exceptions if (a) stock in more than one 
controlled corporation is distributed, and (b) the transac-
tion " facilitates the avoidance of the dividend provisions 
of the Code through the subsequent sale or exchange of 
stock of one corporation and the retention of the stock of 
another corporation." '67 This distribution of a sister cor-
poration exception to the stock exception is a sound 
innovation . The regulations also soundly limit the excep-
tion which arises when there are no earnings and profits. 
It is not avai lable to a distributing corporation with built-
in gains. ' 68 
As a matter of substantive policy. however. the govern-
ment may still have been too permissive regarding the 
hypothetical redemption transactions. Certainty comes 
at a price. The addition of section 303 indicates that the 
drafters' attention was focused on capital gains treatment 
and not on any continuing ability of a shareho lder to 
withdraw income without impairing her equity in the 
retained business. In a hypothetical section 302(b)(3) 
"complete termination of interest" distribution of stock in 
a single controlled corporation. a bailout without impair-
ment of equity by definition cannot arise. However, the 
hypothetical redemption cou ld qualify as a "substantially 
disproportionate" redemption under section 302(b)(2) . A 
" 'Prop. Treas. reg. section 1.355-2(c)(1) (1977). 
"' Id. 
I·JSee Helfand & Lafving. Part 3. supra note 96. 
'··Preamble. supra. 54 Fed. Reg. at 287. 
1·'Treas. reg. section 1.355-2(d)(5)(i) (1989). 
"·'d. section s 1.355-2(d)(5)(ii). (iii) . and (iv) . 
1·' ld. section 1.355-2(d)(5)(i) (last sentence). 
'''' Id. section 1.355-2(d)(5)(ii)(C). 
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less-than-5D-percent shareholder in the post-distribution 
corporation could retain an interest in the distributing 
corporation which was reduced only 20 percent (say 
from 50 percent to 40 percent) and receive a 100 percent 
interest in the controlled corporation which could even 
continue to do business with the distributing corporat ion . 
A section 303(a) transaction presents an even greater 
bailout opportunity since the distribution could be com-
pletely pro rata and involve a related function . In short. 
section 303 is an unsuitable gauge of dividend equiva-
lency. 
A safe harbor for a partial liquidation under section 
302(b)(4) is not available here because it requires distri -
bution of either five-year active business assets that are 
not in corporate form or the proceeds from sale of these 
assets. Distribution of stock in a controlled corporation . 
therefore, cannot qualify as a partial liquidation under 
section 302(b)(4)' 69 and. hence, cannot qualify under sec-
tion 302(a) . Congress must have intended this result 
because in a partial liquidating distribution (whiCh may 
be pro rata) of five-year active business assets or the 
proceeds of their sale automatically satisfies the special 
dividend equivalency test under sections 302(e)(1 )(A) 
and (2)(A) . Thus, the hypothetical redemption exception 
should not be available to a hypothet ical partial liquida-
tion. A published ruling to that effect would be helpful . 
Section 303 is an unsuitable gauge of dividend 
equivalency. 
The 1989 regulations accompany this new provIsion 
with only two examples . The first is a balancing example 
from the device-nondevice factor portion of the regula-
tions (with excessive cash in a pro rata division tipping 
the scale to device) with the additional determinative 
factor of no earnings and profitsY o The second example 
illustrates the exception to the hypothetical section 302(a) 
redemption for distributions of two (or more) corporations 
which could facilitate a subsequent bailout. The sparse-
ness of examples in the regulations might represent 
some relative discomfort on the part of Treasury or the 
Service with these safe harbors rather than their newness. 
since dividend equivalency had long been a favored 
Service test for device. 
4. Business Purpose. The three major business pur-
pose section 355 issues since Whitman wrote have been 
whether (a) in a tax-free division a business purpose 
could outweigh device factors , for example. ready sale-
ability; (b) a business purpose test must be met indepen-
dently whether device potential exists. for example. a 
completely non pro rata division due to hostility between 
equal shareholders; and (c) shareholder business purpose 
alone could sufficeY' The 1989 version of the business 
purpose requirement for purposes of section 355 ad-
dresses all of these questions as well as a number of 
1·'Morgenstern v. Commissioner. 56 T.C. 44 (1971) . 
17°Treas. reg . section 1.355-2(d)(5)(ji) (1989). 
171 See, e.g., Wh itman, supra note 9, at 1245-51. 
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other troubling issues not dealt with in the 1955 regula-
tions or the 1977 proposals. 
The introduction into the 1989 regulations of business 
purpose as a counterbalancing nondevice factor is dis-
cussed above. Turning to bus iness purpose as an inde-
pendent requirement , Whitman showed that the congres-
sional purpose in adding the device language to the 1939 
Code was to head off judicial glosses on the revenue 
statute. Business purpose and continuity of interest had 
arisen in just th is fashion. Whitman also opposed the 
government's reliance on the business purpose and con-
ti nuity of interest doctrines under section 355 as well as 
its even heavier reliance on the active business test. He 
saw th is reliance as the result of the Service's eq uation of 
device with d ividend equivalency. '72 The First Circuit in 
Rafferty found Whitman's argument convincing. The Ninth 
Circuit's hOlding in Commissioner v. Wilson seemed to 
require the retention of the 1955 business purpose cri-
terion as an independent test in subsequent versions of 
the regu lations.173 The reasoning and examples in the 
1989 revised regu lations and Professo r Davis' concept of 
"structured discretion" establish that the business pur-
pose requirement should be independent of the device 
test. This result seems proper. 
Business purpose does, indeed, provide more discretion 
to the courts and the Service in applying the regulations 
in ruling requests as well as on audits. But Congress was 
wrong in fearing that discretion in the context of section 
355. Congress is slow to f ine-tune tax laws un less major 
revenue loss or administrative irritants are involved , and 
the administering agency needs tools to meet unantici-
pated developments. A broader standard is more l ikely to 
provide those tools-business purpose here- than are 
detailed rules . For instance, the Service apparently used 
the business purpose test to thwart the use of section 355 
to pare down a corporation with too many assets, share-
holders , or controlled subsidiaries, which could not be 
read ily liquidated into the parent , in order to satisfy one 
or more of the 1986-1988 General Utilities' transition 
rules, the section 355 number of shareholders ceiling , or 
the affiliated group prohibition for S corporation elec-
tions. '74 
As illustrated by an example in the 1989 regulations, an 
independent business purpose test requires a corporate 
business purpose other than saving Federal income taxes 
(for exam pie, by an S corporation election) or state taxes 
arising out of the same transaction amounting to less 
than the Federal income taxes. 175 Such broader discretion 
is needed in addition to the more structured discretion 
under the device portion of the regu lations. Even here, 
however, the discretion is not totally unstructured. Unfor-
tunately, many taxpayers apparently made distributions 
in order to elect S corporation status without requesting 
rulings. 176 
"'Whi tman, supra note 9, at 1235, 1239, 1241; accord. Lee, 
supra, 27 Tax l. Rev. at 477. 
"'353 F.2d 184 (9th Cir. 1965); see Lee, supra, 46 J. Tax. at 200; 
Preamble, 54 Fed. Reg. at 283. 
17'See Sheppard. "Section 355 Regulat ions. " supra note 148 at 
274; Simon & Simmons. "The Future of Section 355," 40 Tax 
Notes 291 . 300 (July 18,1988). 
"'Preamble, 54 Fed. Reg. at 284; Treas . reg. sections 1.355-
2(b)(2) and 2(b)(5) Ex. (6) (1989). 
17"1 was so informed in a telephone conversation with a 
National Office reorganizat ions specialist. 
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Following the 1955 regu lat ions' bare bones business 
purpose (and con ti nuity of interest) requirements, the 
1977 proposed regulations provided for tax-free separa-
tion only if the distribution was carried out for purposes 
"germane to the business of the corporations," but added 
that "a shareholder purpose may be so nearly coex tensive 
with corporate business purpose as to preclude any 
distinct ion ." 177 Furthermore, the 1977 proposals conta ined 
four examples dealing with corporate business purpose 
or its absence. Responding to comments, the govern-
ment explained in the PreamblellB that a coextensive 
business purpose is acceptab le, and the new regulations 
provide an example . A non pro rata division along busi-
ness lines of a two-business corporation between equal 
shareholders was made so that each could devote fu ll-
time attention to one business, a move wh ich was ex-
pected to enhance the operations of both businesses. 
This transact ion was carried out for a corporate busi ness 
purpose (presumably enhancement of operations) " not-
withstanding that it is also carried out in part for share-
holder purposes."179 Presumably, shareho lder disagree-
ment about corporate operations also gives rise to a 
corporate busi ness purpose. 
An independent business purpose test requires 
a corporate business purpose other than saving 
Federal/ncome taxes . .. , 
The First Circuit's reasoning in Rafferty regarding 
shareholder business purpose had not proceeded along 
the lines of coextensive ness, but instead required that the 
shareholder purposes be "germane to the continuance of 
the corporate business." '8o The court made an oblique 
reference to Whitman 's example of a corporation's di-
viding its automobile dealership and its real estate prem-
ises to protect the dealership from the so le shareholder's 
ex-spouse. The sole shareholder pledged the stock in the 
spun-off real estate corporat ion as security for alimony 
payments and thus could not sell the spun-off corpora-
tion to outsiders, nor would he , in Whitman 's view, 
defau lt in effect selling the spun-off stock to the ex-
spouse since she then would become his operating 
corporation's lessor.'8 ' Whitman found no device potential 
there, but the reasoning of the 1989 regulat ion example 
would suggest that the shareholder purpose of keeping 
the ex-spouse away from the automobile dealership also 
served the corporate purpose of avoidance of dissension. 
The 1977 proposals used an example to explain the re-
quirement of a business purpose for the distribution of 
the controlling stock interest in a distributed subsidiary 
as well as a business purpose for the formation of the 
"'Prop. Treas. reg. section 2.355-2(b)(1) (1977). 
178Preamble, supra. 54 Fed. Reg. at 284; see Helfand & Lafving, 
"Filling the Serbonian Bog with Quicksand- Proposed Section 
355 Regulations Further Obscure Corporate Separations-Part 
2," 6 J . Corp. Tax. 53, 60-68 (1979) . 
''"Treas. reg. section 1.355-2(b)(5) Ex. (2) (1989) . 
,sORafferty. 452 F.2d at 770. 
l SI Whitman , supra note 9, at 1242-43. 
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subsidiary,l S2 The 1989 revised regulations continued 
that example but added a further clarifying example, A 
transaction in which the distribution served a business 
purpose still does not qualify for tax deferral if it can be 
accomplished by another tax-free transaction, as ex-
plained in the Preamble,ls3 The regulations state: 
If a corporate business purpose can be achieved 
through a nontaxable transaction that does not 
involve the distri bution of stock of a controlled sub-
sidiary and which is neither impractical nor unduly 
expensive, then, , . the separation is not carried out 
for that corporate business purpose. '8' 
The 1989 regulations illustrate this principle at several 
pOints. ISS This formulation of nontaxable alternatives to 
the corporation divison in asseSSing business purpose is 
preferable to the Rafferty approach of rejecting the tax-
payer's proferred business purpose (shareholder estate 
planning) because this pu rpose "could be fully satisfied 
by a bailout of dividendS." ls6 This could lead to a test of 
whether the same result could be obtained by a taxable 
alternative. 
The reworking of the business purpose provi-
sions contained In the 1989 regulations Is a 
major accomplishment. 
The reworking of the business purpose provIsions 
contained in the 1989 regulations is a major accomplish-
ment. Like the earlier versions, the final regulations 
preserve independent business purpose requirement as a 
standard to disqualify transactions that, though not bail-
outs, still do not merit tax deferral due to broader tax 
policies. Examples of these policies include protecting 
General Utilities repeal and its transition rule or prevent-
ing abuse in C to S conversions. Fortunately, the final 
regulations address various issues raised by comments 
on the 1977 proposals, other commentators, and the 
Service's own ruling experience. They do so through 
generalizations about policy, followed by carefully crafted 
examples relating to the generalizations, 187 Regulation 
drafting has been raised to an art form , 
5. Conllnulty of Interest. Continuity of interest, like 
the business purpose doctrine, was judicially fashioned 
18'Prop. Treas. reg . section 1.355-2(b)(2) Ex. (3) (1977), 
"'Preamble. supra, 54 Fed , Reg , at 284, 
"'Treas. reg . section 1 ,355-2(b)(3) (1989), 
,s' See, e.g" id. sections 1.355-2(b)(5) Exs. (3), (4), and 2(c)(4) 
Ex. (1) . 
"'Rafferty, 452 F,2d at 771, 
'"'Thus, the new regulations address more fully in text and 
examples (1) mixture of Federal income tax savings and non tax 
savings motives, (2) shareholder motives, (3) availability of 
alternate nontaxable, practicable arrangements, (4) use of bus i-
ness purpose as a device defense, (5) balanc in g of device 
factors and business purpose, and (6) further elaboration of 
evidence of business purpose, For a discuss ion of rulings matrix 
from which many of the 1989 generalizations and exa mples were 
drawn, see Schneider, supra note 37, at 606-10. 
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and only contained in bare bones fashion in the 1955 
regu lations.'ss Whitman and the First Circuit in Rafferty 
opposed Service reliance on the continuity of interest 
doctrine since they viewed it as a concomitant of the 
government's refusal to give form and substance to the 
device restrict ion . 'S9 The 1977 proposal neither added 
examples nor amplified the mere statement that the 
continuity of interest doctrine applies to section 355 
divisions.190 As a policy matter, the shareholder-level 
"continuity of interest" doctrine should apply to section 
355 if it serves a broader pu rpose than merely preventing 
bailouts. The policy of the continuity of proprietary inter-
est doctrine is that reorganization treatment should be 
limited to historic shareholders who maintain a Significant 
proprietary interest in the continuing corporations. '9' The 
1989 revisions apply the continuity of interest doctrine to 
corporate divisions by requiring that the historic share-
holders maintain continuity in each of the resulting 
corporations. '92 
The 1989 regulations add four examples illustrating the 
continuity of interest requirement, "the principles of 
which are based on previously established revenue ru l-
ings ." '93 In contrast to the other section 355 regulation 
areas , neither the text nor the Preamble spell out the 
parameters of the continuity of interest requirement itself . 
Nonetheless, the examples indicate some boundaries. 
Continuity of interest exists where the prior owners in the 
aggregate retain at least 50 percent of their equity inter-
est in each of the post-division corporations. ,g4 Con -
versely, retention of only a 20 percent interest by a former 
owner (or owners) in one of the post-division corporations 
is not sufficient. ' 95 
The probable reason for the absence of further explana-
tion of continuity of interest doctrine is that the govern-
ment does not spell out the parameters of the doctrine as 
to an acquisitive reorganization as defined in section 368, 
merely requiring a 50 percent continuity for advance 
ruling purposes.'9" The case law had allowed a consider-
"'Treas. reg, section 1 ,355-2(c) (1955) (included in paragraph 
captioned "Business Purpose") . 
'69 Whitman, supra note 8, at 1239, 1241: Cf. Rafferty, 452 F.2d 
at 770 (prefer approach of requiring showing in case of personal 
motives as to distribution with bailout potential that such motives 
were "germane to the continuance of the corporate business . .. 
overreliance upon formulations such as 'business purpose,' and 
'active business' ") . 
,ooProp, Treas, reg , section 1.355-2(b)(2) (1977) (next to last 
sentence) ("continu ity of interest" added to caption of para-
graph) , 
"'See Sheppard, "Section 355 Regulations," supra note 148, at 
274-75: Faber, supra note 149. 
'92Treas, reg . section 1 ,355-2(c)( 1) (1989) states: 
[Sect ion ] 355 requ ires that one or more persons who, 
directly or indirectly, were the owners of the enterprise 
prior to the distribution or exchange own, in the aggregate, 
an amount of stock establishing a continuity of interest in 
each of the modified corporate forms in wh ich the enter-
prise is conducted after the separation. 
'"'Preamble, supra, 54 Fed, Reg , 291: Treas. reg , section 1,355-
2(c)(2) (1989). 
"' Id, section 1.355-2(c)(2) Ex. (2) . 
'"' Id, section 1.355-2(c)(2) Ex. (4) . 
"'Rev. Proc, 77-37, section 3,02, 1977-2 C.B, 568, 569. 
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ably lower level , but not as low as 20 percent. 197 The 
revised regulations continue the statement in prior ver-
sions that "section 355 contemplates the continued opera-
tion of the business or businesses existing prior to the 
separation .",gS The general reorganizat ion regulations 
historically had used similar language in referring to 
"continuity of business enterprise" requirement.'99 Trea-
sury recently interpreted this in the acquisitive reorgani-
zation context as requiring either continuation of the 
target's "historic business" or use of a significant portion 
of target's historic business assets in a business. 2oo "Sig-
nificant" here may require business use of one-third of 
T's historic assets.201 Private rulings under section 355, 
however, have found the "active business" requirement 
satisfied when as little as five or six percent of the assets 
of one of the post-division corporations was used in the 
active conduct of a trade or business. 202 
The 1989 revisions apply the continuity of In-
terest doctrine to corporate divisions . ... 
While the business purpose and continuity of proprie-
tary interest requirements can effectuate policies not met 
by the statutory requirements, the continuity of business 
enterprise doctrine's objectives would be covered by the 
device test.2°3 The absence of examples and discussion 
on the 1989 Preamble indicate that the reference on the 
new regulations was more a reflex action than thoughtful 
requirement. 
\9' The most commonly reli ed upon case law benchmark is 38 
percent or 40 percent derived from John A. Nelson Co. v. 
Helvering, 296 U.S. 374 (1935). The Court found the requisite 
continuity of proprietary interest where the target corporation 's 
assets were transferred for 38 percent preferred stock in the 
acquiring company and 62 percent cash. See generally 
Schneider, supra note 37, at 599 n. 185. 
"·Compare Treas. reg. section 1.355-1(b) (1989) with Treas. 
reg. section 1.355-1(b) (1955) and Prop. Treas. reg. section 
1.355-1(b) (1977) . 
'··Matthews, "Conference Covers the Waterfront on 1989 Tax 
Issues," 42 Tax Notes 1540 (March 27, 1989). 
2OOTreas. reg. section 1.368-1 (d)(2) (1980) . 
'0' Ct. Treas. reg . sections 1.368-1(d)(3)(ii) and (5) Ex. (1) 
(continuation of a significant line of business satisfied by con -
tinuation of one of three equal lines) . These regulations also 
provide that determination of whether a portion of assets is 
"significant" is "based on the relative importance of the assets to 
operation of the business. However, all other facts and circum-
stances, such as net fair market value of those assets, will be 
considered." Id. section 1.368-1 (d)(4)(iii) . 
,0'GCM 34238 (five percent) ; Llr. Ruling 8712019 (s ix percent). 
See Silverman , "Corporate Divisions Under Section 355," 41st 
Va. Conf. on Fed. Tax'n 124 (June 1,1989). 
203A predistribution sale of most of the active business assets 
and the holding of the proceeds by either or both of the post-
division corporations would constitute evidence of device. Treas. 
reg . section 1.355-2(d)(2)(iv)(B) (1989) . If, however, neither the 
device nor the active business test would cover the sa le (not 
"i mmediately after" the separation) by a post-division corpora-
tion of su bstantially all of its active business assets, then the 
continuity of business enterprise doctrine should be available. 
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III. WHAT IS NEXT? 
Ironically, the 1986 repeal of the capital gains prefer-
ence has in most cases eliminated the traditional advan-
tage of an earnings bailout over a dividend payment in 
the absence of offsetting capital losses.204 Shareholder 
basiS recovery is the only remaining issue. But with the 
1986 repeal of the General Utilities shelter for corporate 
asset appreciation in non liquidating and liquidating distri-
butions,205 the planning and policy focus now is on 
deferring recognition of inside gain in a corporate divi-
sion.206 Potential abuses include (1) a deferred non pro 
rata split-off/Esmark transaction in which P purchases a 
minority interest in T (or at least less than 80 percent). 
waits a decent interval (say two years), and then ex-
changes the minority T stock interest for a desired 
division of T, a section 355 division;207 and (2) T distributes 
an incorporated division pro rata to its shareholders 
anticipating that after a decent interval, they will sell it to 
P in a transactional carryover basis acquisition .208 In both 
cases, T has escaped tax on inside gain. 
The continuity of proprietary interest test looks both 
backward and forward . The 1989 regulations do not 
address how long before and after the corporate separa-
tion this continuity must exist. Practitioners use two 
years as a rule of thumb (based on the facts of a 
published ruling) for the continuity of interest lookback 
period, and presumably, they use the same period to look 
forward as well.209 Whether any waiting period clearly 
establishes continuity of interest where a post-acquisition 
division is contemplated at acquisition or a post-division 
2°'Restoration of the capital gains preference as to se lected 
capital assets, specifically including stock, is much in the news 
these days. See "Capital Gains Issue," 43 Tax Notes 1009-32 
(May 22, 1989) and cites id. at 1029. 
205Thus, sections 336 and 338 now treat a liquidating distribu-
tion and the erstwhile deemed liquidating distribution as a 
deemed (recognition) sale at the corporate level at fair market 
value. 1954 Code section 337 providing a corporate level shield 
as to bulk sales pursuant to a timely liqu idation simply has been 
repealed. 
206See Sheppard, "Sect ion 355 Regulations," supra note 148. 
2°' lf P purchases 80 percent or more of T, then P must hold the 
T stock for five years before distributing the unwanted assets in 
corporate so lution pursuant to section 355. IRC section 355 
(b)(2)(D) . 
206When in early January 1989 I sketched this scenario to the 
National Office ruling speCialist, his response was to the effect 
that what was done after two years was not relevant. 
2O·Sheppard, "Section 355 Regulat ions," supra note 148, at 274 
(Rev. Ru!. 74-5, 1974-1 C.B. 82, accepted a distribution two years 
after the purchase); Sheppard, "Spin Cycle: Whither Section 
355," 38 Tax Notes 109 (January 11, 1988). Attempts to skirt the 
two-year waiting requirement using devices such as "alphabet" 
or subsidiary tracking stock will probably and properly be 
thwarted by the new sect ion 337(d) regulations to come. See 
Sheppard, "Trier Discusses Corporate Tax Issues; Section 355 
Regulations Are Imminent," 41 Tax Notes 1368 (December 28, 
1988). 
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sale is contemplated at the time of division, is highly 
probiematical.2IO 
In the limited area of a corporate distributee which 
acquired "control" (80 percent stock interest) of the 
distributing corporation, Congress imposed in 1987 a 
five-year holding per iod requirement.2 " Professors Simon 
and Simmons convincing ly argue that a broader five-year 
holding period requ irement going forward should be 
statutori ly extended (while st ill requiring only 40 to 50 
percent aggregate conti nuity in each post-distribution 
corporation) .212 
Practitioners use two years as a rule of thumb 
... for the continuity of Interest lookback pe-
rlod ... . 
A forward-looking holding period poses many more 
problems. First, as Professors Simon and Simmons point 
out ,213 unless a floor approach (say five percent or more 
of all shareholders) is used, section 355 would be unavail-
able to publicly traded corporations due to the current 
heavy annual turnover in their stock. Second, post-
distribution sales are already the subject of the device 
standards. Third, distinctions between pro rata and non 
pro rata separations would have to be drawn. Otherwise, 
hostile non pro rata divisions would give the share-
holders of each post-division corporation a means to 
trigger at least inside corporate level recognit ion of gain 
to the other corporation(s) by selling all of the stock of 
their post-division corporation shortly after the corporate 
division . And fourth, the inside gain recognition problem 
is inextricab ly tied to the policy of safeguarding the 1986 
"'The Seventh Circuit found that the step-transaction applied 
and continuity of interest was broken where target shareholders 
and purchasing shareholders both expected that the target 
shareholders would sel l their purchasing stock in a subsequent 
optional piggyback reg istration (the economics dictated that the 
target shareho lders wou ld so opt and they did) . McDonald's of 
Illinois v. Commissioner, 688 F.2d 520 (7th Cir. 1982). An abusive 
situation may prompt application of the step transaction where 
the inten t to engage in a post-acquisition non pro rata division or 
post-division sa le is equal ly strong or clear but the economic 
inducement is less strong. A lesser, but still potential danger is 
that a post-distribution contemplated shareholder sale of the 
spun-off controlled su bsid iary wi ll be imputed back to the 
distributed corporation under an extension of Commissioner v. 
Transport Trading & Terminal Corp., 176 F.2d 570 (2d Cir. 1949), 
cert. denied, 338 U.S. 955, reh'ing denied, 339 U.S. 416 (1950) , 
and Bush Bros. & Co. v. Commissioner, 668 F.2d 252 (6th Cir. 
1982). The Tax Court has recently applied a "more relaxed test" 
where the distributed property is neither inventory nor its equ iva-
lent, viz.; the distribu ting corporation must in substance have 
sold the property. Anderson v. Commissioner, 92 T.C. NO. 9 
(Jan. 26,1989) (1989) . 
''' IRC section 355(b)(2)(D) . 
"'Simon & Simmons, supra note 174, at 299, 300. 
''' Id. at 297. 
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repeal of the General Utilities doctrine2 14 and the issue of 
self-help elective carryover basis acquisitions when only 
part of target's assets are desired .215 Any further amend-
ments to section 355 should take the form of reopening 
year one (at the shareholder and corporate levels) along 
the lines of section 302(c)(2)(A) (flush paragraph) , if a 
triggering sale occurs. 
21'The 1986 repeal of the codified General Utilities doctrine 
(noncorporate-Ievel recognition upon (a) nonliquidat ing and 
liqu idating distributions of property, 1954 Code sections 311 
and 336, and (b) sales and deemed sales pursuant to liquidations 
and deemed liquidations, 1954 Code sections 337 and 338) was 
in large part rat ionalized as needed to prevent artificial encour-
agement of mergers. 
A corporat ion acquiring the assets of a l iquidating cor-
porat ion was able to obtain a basis in assets equal to their 
fair market va lue, although the transferor recognized no 
gain (other than possibly recapture amounts) on the sale. 
The tax benefits made the assets potentially more valuable 
in the hands of a transferee than in the hands of the 
current owner. This might induce corporations with su b-
stantia l appreciated assets to liquidate and transfer their 
assets to other corporations for tax reasons, when eco-
nomic considerations might indicate a different course of 
action. Staff Joint Comm. , General Explanation of the Tax 
Reform Act of 1986 (H .R. 3838). 386 (1987) . 
The reality was that due to the " recaptu re income" (including 
statutory depreciation recaptu re) override to the General Utilities 
shield , see id. at 333-34, 336, most corporate acquiSit ions of 
cap ital intensive corporations during the late 1954 Code were 
not cast as cost-basis acquisitions because the impact of the 
recapture income tax exceeded the present value of the basis 
step-up-an exception then (and now) arose where target's 
NOLs would offset the gain recognized upon liquidation. See 
Lee, supra, 8 Va. Tax Rev . at 116-17 and n. 251. The real tax goal, 
particularly in leveraged buyouts (other than use of interest 
deductions to shelter target's income) , was to dispose of un-
wanted target assets (bust-up takeovers) wi thout triggering an 
inside corporate tax on appreciation. This is where "mirror 
transactions, " "son of mirror," etc., and section 355 come in. See 
Sheppard, "Mirror Moves: Life Without the General Utilities 
Ru le," 32 Tax Notes 847 (September 1, 1986); Sheppard, "Enforc-
ing General Utilit ies Repeal ," 32 Tax Notes 121 7 (September 29, 
1986); Sheppard , "The Prodigal Son of Mirror, " 34 Tax Notes 444 
(February 2, 1987); Axelrod, "Section 304, Excess Loss Accounts 
and Other Consolidated Return Gall imaufry," 36 Tax Notes 729 
(August 17, 1987); Sheppard , "Through the Looking Glass, " 35 
Tax Notes 436 (May 4, 1987); Sheppard, " Spin Cycle, " supra 
note 209; Walter, " Spin-Otis, Split-Offs and Split-Ups in Two-
Step Acquis iti ons and Dispositions," 66 Taxes 970 (1988); Pull -
man , Warner & Jacokes, " Notice 87-14 and the Section 1503 
(e)(3)(A) Regulations, " 42 Tax Notes 737 (Feb. 6, 1989). Availa-
bility of such techniques to avoid inside recognition would 
encourage or at least fac i litate takeovers or at least acquisitions 
of non-recently spun-off parts of ta rgets (or acquisitions of part 
of target to enable a non pro rata division a while later) . 
"'A notion that has been batted about is that "mirror transac-
tions" and other transactional elect ive carryover basis as to 
selected lines of business techniques, presumably including 
pred ivision acquisition of a minority interest looking forward to 
non pro rata division and pro rata divis ion looking forward to a 
later sale , are not inconsistent with the General Utilities repeal 
because they permit only an outside stock basis step-up and in 
effect an elective carryover basis. See, e.g ., letters by Pete r 
Faber, Esq., 32 Tax Notes 1022 (September 8, 1986); 32 Tax 
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Very early in the development of section 355 under the 
1954 Code, " prestigious groups of commentators," in 
Whitman 's words,2 '6 recommended that the severity of 
the section 355 definitional requiremen ts be mitigated by 
statutorily granting the Service the power to rule favorably 
on otherwise taxable transactions. Whitman's telling criti-
cism then was the lack of standards to guide this discre-
tion . Now that the revised regulations have substantially 
eased this severity and have provided ample structured 
discretion for the exercise of this ruling authority, the 
policy of mandatory advance approval should be recon-
sidered, not to lighten the impact of section 355 this t ime, 
but to implement it. A mandatory advance ruling regime 
shol,Jld provide very simple procedures for common, 
nonabusive transactions, for example, non pro rata divi-
sions of small active businesses between small numbers 
of historic shareholders. Alternatively, more narrow me-
chanical rules without an advance ruling requirement 
could be provided (optional or mandatory) for simple 
transactions with mandatory structured discretion for 
more complex transactions. 
The Service's recent decision not to give com-
fort rulings . .. should not prevent adoption of a 
mandatory advance ruling program for section 
355 transactions. 
The Service's recent decision not to give comfort 
rulings to transactions where the legal result is readily 
ascertainable should not prevent adoption of a mandatory 
advance ruling program for section 355 transactions. 217 
Nor should the recent Service announcement that it will 
refuse to rule that there is a business purpose for a 
distribution of controlled corporation stock: where Fed-
eral tax savings are greater than state tax savings; where 
Notes 1205 (September 22, 1986) . Beyond the fact that Congress 
has not yet enacted elective carryover basis, see letter by 
Michael Schier, id. at 1204, elective carryover basis under the 
final 1985 subchapter C proposals would not extend to such 
partial asset acquisitions. See Staff Sen. Fin . Comm .. "The 
Subchapter C Revision Act of 1985," 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 50 (S. 
Print 47, 1985) (acquisition of control of target or 70 percent of 
gross fair market value or 90 percent of net fair market value 
necessary for elective carryover basis) . Furthermore, if as ex-
pected "mirror transactions, " etc., are stopped by Treasury, use 
of section 355 to achieve the same "elective" carryover basis 
without recognition of inside appreciation by the distributing 
corporation perversely will favor friendly takeovers of desired 
assets over hostile bust-up takeovers violating the tax policy of 
horizontal equity or economic efficiency. 
2'6Whitman, supra note 8, at 1249 (ALI and the House Ways 
and Means Committee Advisory Group on subchapter C) . 
217Rev, Proc. 89-34, 1989-20 IRB 145. The Service, however, 
has decided to "back off" this policy for six months. Rosen, 
" 'Comfort Rulings' Stance Will Be Reversed, Scott Tells ABA 
Tax Section," 44 Tax Notes 629 (Aug. 7, 1989). Moreover, the 
IRS more recently stated that the "no comfort rulings" policy 
should not affect section 355 ruling requests. Ann. 89-105,1989-
35 IRB 1, Q&A 12. 
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Federal tax reductions coexist with foreign tax reductions; 
or whether potential Federal tax savings are the substan-
tial motivation of a transaction with a different asserted 
business purpose.218 Some inside and outside of govern-
ment argue, however, that the government has nothing to 
gain from approvi ng taxpayers' asserted business pur-
poses if the result is to hamstring the Service when it later 
questions the propriety of the deferral for the trans-
action ! '9 
The regulations could provide more mechanical 
rules lor transactions not seeking advance 
approval .. .. 
What can the government do in the absence of manda-
tory advance ruling requirements?220 First, both the cor-
poration and the shareholder could be required to red-
flag section 355 transactions in which no advance ruling 
is sought. This requirement should work somewhat along 
the lines of section 751 (b) transactionsY' Second , the 
regulations could provide more mechanical rules for 
transactions not seeking advance approval , but the litiga-
tion experience under section 355 (Coady and Rafferty) 
suggests that this should be implemented only with a 
statutory foundation . Third, consideration should be given 
to inducements for seeking a ruling . A ruling has advan-
tages in addition to certainty of result , as illustrated by 
regulations under section 755 and elsewhere .222 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The evolution of the section 355 regulations from 1955 
to 1989 remarkably parallels Professor Davis' thoughts 
about "Discretionary Justice." Starting with a broad legis-
lative and tax common-law framework - requirements 
relating to active business, device, business purpose, and 
continuity of interest-the regulation drafters first em-
ployed bare bones tests in all areas, except the active 
218Rev. Proc. 89-39, 1989-25 IRB 17. 
21"Sheppard, "Section 355 and Business Purpose," 43 Tax 
Notes 794 (May 15, 1989) . 
22°The ideas following in text owe much to a brainstorming 
session with my colleagues Elmer Schaefer and Alan Gunn. 
221 Treas. reg . section 1.751 -1(b)(5). Return preparers (and 
apparently practitioners in general) frequently if not universally 
"overlook" this requirement or more accurately section 751 (b) 
itself, which has been argued as reason to repeal section 751(b) . 
Hearings on H.R. 1658, H.R 2571 , H.R. 3397, and H.R. 4448 
(Issues Relat ing to Passthrough Entities) before the Subcom-
mittee on Select Revenue Measures of the House Ways and 
Means Comm., 99th Cong ., 2d Sess. 61 (1986) (statement of Joel 
Rabinovitz. Esq .). I think it is instead grounds to impose return 
preparer penalties, malpractice sanctions, or fraud penalties 
depending on the level of understanding of subchapter K prac-
titioner-return preparer. The repeal the provision argument 
reminds me of Queen Isabella's rationalization for expelling the 
Spanish Jews in 1492-that they were causing the descendents 
of the 1391 forced Jewish converts to Christianity to Judaize. 
"'Treas. reg . section 1.755- ' (a)(2): ct. Temp. Treas. reg . sec-
tion 1.338-4T(t)(6)(iv) . 
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business requirement. The 1955 regulations set forth 
more detai led principles and accompan ied them w ith 
numerous examples which were not, however, exp licitl y 
re lated to the rules in the text . With this framework, the 
Service commenced ruling and litigati ng, princ ipally fo-
cusi ng on t he active business test at f irst and then after a 
decade on the device restricti on as well. 
The 1989 revisions . .. do provide detailed and 
... sensible guidelines for discretionary justice 
as to the device standard. 
of the General Utilities doctrine in the 1986 Code) and the 
suggestions of commente rs, do provide detailed and , I 
believe, sensible, guideli nes for discretionary justice as 
to the device standard . Furthermore, in all areas except 
the co ntinuity of interest doctr ine, the new regulat ions 
prov ide a detailed framework of principles in text. Careful 
ill ustrations often have cross references to text and 
usually explicitly tie together the principles and examp les 
in the Preamble. (Should this excellent format continue, 
the Code of Federal Regulations and commercial pub-
lishers of tax regulations will need to include the preamble 
with the regulat ions as the Federal Register does.) 
Althoug h further refinement is possible in the continuity 
of interest context, the 1989 regulations otherwise take 
the current section 355 about as far as it can go. Congress 
should revise section 355 in a more substantia l way than 
Acting in an increasing ly collaborative mode, courts the 1987 revision. Now that structured discretionary jus-
and commentators attacked the Service's mechanical tice is available, mandatory advance rulings by the Service 
reliance on the active business test (and particularly the should be required (with increased costs passed on to 
separate business corOllary), ca ll ing for primary reliance the users). A simplified check-the-box fo rm should be 
upon a standard instead - the device restriction . The provided for garden variety, especially non pro rata , 
government responded in 1977 with proposed amend- vertical or separate business divisions. A statutory five-
ments to the section 355 regulations. They embodied a year holding period to establish c,:,ntinuity of interest 
shift in emphasis from active business to device, ex- shou ld be enacted . Elective carryover basis, which would 
panded the device prinCiples, and reflected past ruling excuse corporations from recognition of inside gain . also 
experience and criticism in the commentary. The guid- should be enacted and decoupled from the reorganization 
ance about the mean ing of device was raised to about the provisons. A five-year hold ing period going forward 
same level of soph istication as the 1955 active busi ness should be requi red for pro rata divisions , and bolstered 
provisions in the regulations. But the 1977 examples were by the th reat of reopening year one at the corporate and 
stil l not clear, and the proposed regulations fai led to shareholder levels if post-distribution sales create a bail-
provide gu idelines for discretionary just ice. out shou ld be cons idered. But for the present. let us 
The 1989 revisions reflecting further ruling experience celebrate a job well done in the 1989 revised regulat ions. 
;n pa<l und" changed cond;l ;on, (Ihe a«.,malh of 'epea® _____________________ _ 
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